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Scholars speculate that government apologies and compensation for historical 
injustices promote forgiveness and reconciliation, as well as psychologically benefit members 
of the victimized group. However, they have not offered theory or compelling evidence in 
support of these assumptions, nor do they discuss how redress affects the majority group. 
Across four studies, I examined how Chinese and non-Chinese Canadians psychologically 
responded to offers of apologies and compensation for the Chinese Head Tax. Overall, it was 
better to give than receive the redress. When participants thought redress had not been offered, 
non-Chinese Canadians evaluated it less favorably than Chinese Canadians. But, when 
participants thought redress had been offered, non-Chinese Canadians evaluated it more 
favorably than Chinese Canadians did, confirming the predictions of balance and system 
justification theory. An offer of apology and compensation for the Chinese Head Tax did not 
influence Chinese Canadian participants‘ forgiveness or reconciliation feelings. The redress 
offer also did not lead Chinese Canadians to feel more identified with Canadians or Chinese 
Canadians, nor did it lead Chinese Canadians to evaluate Chinese Canadians more positively. 
On the other hand, the majority group, non-Chinese Canadians, evaluated their group more 
positively and considered the system of government less responsible for the harm when both 
an apology and compensation were offered, as justice motivation and social identity theories 
predict. The current results inform interdisciplinary discussions of the potential effects of 
apologies and compensation by suggesting additional psychological effects of redress. They 
also demonstrate that, despite concerns that the majority will backlash against their 
government giving apologies and compensation, majority group members increased their 
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Throughout history, governments of many countries have committed deliberate 
discriminatory acts against minorities, ranging from unfair taxes to slavery and mass murder. 
These government actions were often legal, approved by legislatures and courts as well as the 
majority of citizens. In retrospect, these actions seem unjust, but what, if anything, should 
current governments do about them? Sometimes governments respond to charges of historical 
injustice by downplaying the magnitude of the harm or even denying that the events occurred. 
For example, despite frequent requests that it acknowledge and apologize for the Armenian 
genocide of 1915, the Turkish government denies that that the episode ever occurred 
(―Armenian Genocide,‖ 2006; Blatz, Schumann & M. Ross, 2008; Starzyk, Blatz, & M. Ross, 
in press). Sometimes governments acknowledge the earlier injustice, but argue that it is too 
late, too difficult, or too expensive to do anything about it. Such arguments are used to justify 
the U.S. federal government‘s refusal to apologize and pay compensation for slavery
1
 
(Brooks, 1999). Sometimes governments maintain that their countries have already done much 
to alleviate historical injustices and they need to focus on current problems (Brooks, 1999). 
Sometimes governments establish inquiries dedicated to detailing and explaining earlier 
injustices, for example, the South African Truth and Reconciliation Commission (Brooks, 
1999). Finally, with increasing frequency in recent decades, governments sometimes 
apologize for historical injustices (Lazare, 2004). These apologies may or may not include 
offers of financial compensation.  
Does it matter how governments respond to historical injustices that occurred decades 
or even centuries ago? Their response seems to matter a great deal to some previously 
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victimized groups. Around the world, groups are demanding that governments acknowledge 
and apologize and offer compensation for historical injustices (Brooks, 1999; Minow, 2002). 
In this thesis, I discuss the psychology of government apologies and compensation for past 
group-directed harms.  
Most past scholarship in this field has focused on the effects of apologies, with little 
mention of compensation. Many authors argue that apologies are an especially potent means 
of resolving conflicts and repairing damaged relationships between individuals, groups, and 
nations (Lazare, 2004; Minow, 2002; Tavuchis, 1991). Psychological research on apologies 
has focused on the impact of interpersonal apologies, in which a single transgressor 
apologizes to another person for recent harms (e.g., Scher & Darley, 1997). In laboratory 
studies, researchers typically present participants with descriptions of hypothetical 
transgressions and vary whether or not (and sometimes how) the transgressor apologizes. 
Participants are asked to infer how a victim might react to the transgressor. Participants infer 
that victims would react with greater forgiveness and improved evaluations of the transgressor 
following an apology (e.g., Scher & Darley, 1997).  
Although many authors insist that government apologies for group-directed harms are 
beneficial (Barkan, 2000; Brooks, 1999; Minow, 2002), there is relatively little empirical 
research on the impact of these kinds of apologies. Indeed, until recent decades, there were 
perhaps too few government apologies to permit serious scrutiny (Lazare, 2004). There is also 
very little theoretical understanding on when, why, or how an apology will be beneficial. 
Legal scholars and historians have conducted the most relevant work on this topic (Barkan, 
2000; Brooks, 1999; Dyzenhaus & Moran, 2006; Minow, 1998; 2002). They argue that 
government sponsored redress promotes reconciliation between the group receiving and 
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giving the apology. These scholars often employ comparative history to substantiate their 
claims (e.g., Brooks, 1999). For example, many compare how Japan‘s unwillingness to 
officially apologize for its wartime actions has prevented reconciliation with its neighbors to 
how Germany‘s many acts of amends for its wartime actions helped build positive relations 
with its neighbors (Barkan, 2000). Although instructive, this evidence is inconclusive because 
countries and past injustices diverge on many dimensions.  
Some scholars have tested whether statements offered by a government official 
improves intergroup feelings using experimental designs that allow a clear determination of 
cause and effect. For example, Nadler and his colleagues asked Israeli-Jewish students to 
respond to a Palestinian leader‘s expression of empathy for the suffering of Israeli-Jews 
(Nadler & Liviatan, 2006; Nadler & Saguy, 2004). Participants were randomly assigned to 
read or not read an expression of empathy. Participants who already trusted Palestinians 
evaluated Palestinians more positively when the leader expressed empathy than when he did 
not. On the other hand, participants who did not already trust Palestinians were unaffected by 
the expression of empathy.  
Although relevant, the studies by Nadler and his associates do not shed much light on 
political apologies for historical harms. Expressions of empathy are not apologies (Lazare, 
2004; Meier, 1998; Tavuchis, 1991). An apology is ―an admission of error or discourtesy 
accompanied by an expression of regret‖ (Merriam-Webster, 2008). The two most important 
components of an apology are to accept responsibility for the actions and express sorrow for 
those actions (Lazare, 2004). Other elements can contribute to the perceived sincerity of an 
apology, such as acknowledging the harm, promising forbearance, and offering repair (Blatz, 
et al., 2008; Tavuchis, 1991), but responsibility and regret are often considered the essence of 
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an apology (Lazare, 2004). It remains to be seen how people respond to statements in which a 
government official takes responsibility for the harms and expresses remorse. Also, the 
research by Nadler and colleagues only examined how Israelis respond to the expression of 
empathy. There is no indication of how Palestinians feel about their leader‘s comments. 
More recent research by Philpot and Hornsey (in press) addressed some of these 
issues. They asked Australian university students to read descriptions of five injustices 
committed against Australia and manipulated whether or not an apology was offered for these 
events. These apologies contained many elements previously identified to be important to 
intergroup apologies (Blatz et al., 2008). Across four studies, the results consistently 
demonstrated that even though participants indicated that the apology was adequate and that 
the apologizing group felt remorse, participants did not report increased forgiveness.  
The Philpot and Hornsey (in press) results may lead to the discouraging conclusion 
that apologies are ineffective. I think that that conclusion is premature for four reasons. The 
first is that forgiveness may not be the best outcome measure of a government apology. Given 
the number of scholars who have proposed that an apology can lead to forgiveness (e.g., 
Gibney, Howard-Hassam, Coicaud, & Steiner, 2008), I think it was important for Philpot and 
Hornsey to demonstrate that forgiveness does not automatically increase because of 
government apologies. For most intergroup injustices forgiveness is impossible (Minow, 
1998). It is illogical to ask descendants of victims to forgive perpetrators. Forgiveness can 
only appropriately be offered by those who suffered the harm, and, in the case of most 
historically injustices, these people have died. Even if it were appropriate, people are not 
likely to forgive murder, abuse, enslavement or other extreme forms of mistreatment. If the 
only reason to apologize is to promote forgiveness, apologies might be ineffective.  
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But forgiveness is different from reconciliation. Forgiveness implies that the victims 
have given up their resentment for the past harm; whereas, reconciliation means that the two 
parties in an earlier conflict now have an amicable relationship. It is probably a common 
occurrence for a person or group to resent their past mistreatment, but still have an agreeable 
relationship with the person or group that harmed them. Some scholars argue that 
reconciliation without forgiveness is particularly likely to arise in political situations (Hamber, 
2007). For gross injustices it is sometimes impossible to forgive. Reconciliation may be all 
that is possible. A good measure of relationship amicability may be how positively the two 
sides evaluate each other – the more positive the relationship, the more positive the intergroup 
feelings. Thus, when a government apologizes on behalf of the majority group, members of 
the previously victimized minority‘s evaluations of the government and majority may 
improve. In this thesis, I assess whether apologies promote both forgiveness and more positive 
intergroup feelings.  
The second reason I think it is premature to conclude that government redress is 
ineffective is that Philpot and Hornsey (in press) did not examine the impact of compensation. 
Many groups that demand an apology also demand some form of compensation, such as cash 
payments, memorial education funds, returning of land, or scholarships. To date, there has 
been little theoretical or empirical examination of compensation offers. I propose that it is 
important to include compensation in these discussions because compensation potentially 
serves a number of important functions. First, compensation signifies that the apology is 
sincere (Minow, 2002). Compensation demonstrates that the government is providing the 
apology because it genuinely regrets the action rather than because it seems like an easy way 
to settle a dispute – colloquially, they are willing to put their money where their mouth is. 
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Thus, when offered in conjunction with an apology, compensation might amplify the effects 
of the apology by making the apology seem more genuine. Second, compensation offers 
symbolically demonstrate that the government will work to correct injustices in the future. For 
example, when he offered compensation for the internment of Japanese Canadians in World 
War II, Prime Minister Brian Mulroney said, ―no amount of money can right the wrong, undo 
the harm, and heal the wounds. But it is symbolic of our determination to address this issue, 
not only in the moral sense but also in a tangible way‖ (Blatz et al., 2008). Third, by offering 
compensation, governments attempt to repair part of the lingering effects caused by the past 
harm, even if only to a meager extent. Government offers of redress vary in the extent to 
which they attempt to offset the harm. Sometimes government try to link the compensation to 
the degree of suffering either at the time or that is felt today. For example, the Canadian 
government‘s compensation offer to residential schools survivors pays everyone who attended 
the schools $10,000, but increases the amount by $3,000 by every year in addition to the first 
a student attended the schools (Bisset, 2007). Students who attended the schools longer 
received more compensation. Other times compensation is more symbolic in that it does not 
link the compensation amount to the original suffering. For example, the Canadian 
government offered $21,000 to every Japanese Canadian person who attended an internment 
camp regardless of how long they attended the camp, or how much property the government 
seized (Japanese Internment National Redress, 1988). 
 In this thesis, I assess the psychological effects of both compensation and apologies 
for historical injustices. In all four studies, I examine the impact of offering both an apology 
and compensation together compared to not offering any redress. In two of the studies, I 
examine whether apologies and compensation, offered individually have a greater or lesser 
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psychological effect than not offering any redress or offering both an apology and 
compensation. I only examine symbolic compensation in this thesis. I focused on symbolic 
compensation because I studied the offer the Canadian government actually made for the 
Chinese Head Tax, which included symbolic payments to Head Tax payers (―Compensation 
Offered,‖ 2006). These are the first studies I am aware of that examine the impact of both an 
apology and compensation for a historical injustice.  
The third reason it may be rash to conclude that government apologies are 
inconsequential is that apologies and compensation offers for historical injustices might have 
other benefits in addition to promoting forgiveness and reconciliation. As I discuss in the next 
section, apologies and compensation might help the victimized minority feel more positive 
about their social identity (Tajfel & Turner, 1986), and have greater faith in the fairness and 
justice of their society (Jost & Hunyady, 2005). The historically mistreated group does not 
have to forgive for the apology to have these effects.  
Finally, I think it is too early to conclude that government redress offers are ineffectual 
because apologies and compensation may affect the majority group as much as the previously 
victimized minority. Very little past scholarship examines the reactions of majority group 
members (e.g., Brooks, 1999; Minow, 2002; Philpot & Hornsey, in press). Usually, the goal of 
apologies and compensation is to benefit the victimized group, but it is not inconsequential if 
these offers have benefits for the majority group. Recalling instances of their group‘s past 
misdeeds can lead present day majority group members to feel less favorably about their 
social identities and social system (e.g., Blatz et al., 2008; Branscombe & Doosje, 2004) even 
though they, personally, had nothing to do with the actions. It would be important to discover 
if an offer of apology and compensation can offset the negative psychological consequences 
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majority group members suffer for the actions of others. Also, how majority group members 
react to an apology and compensation may influence how previously victimized minority 
group members react. If the majority reacts by praising the apology and compensation, it 
communicates that the majority truly regrets the historical injustice, which may amplify any 
potential effects of the apology for the previously victimized minority. On the other hand, if 
the majority protests the apology and compensation, the redress may be undermined. In this 
thesis, I assess whether apologies and compensation have an impact on majority group 
members as well as the previously victimized minority.  
Potential Effects of Apologies and Compensation  
There are at least four potential ways an apology and compensation may help: they 
may promote forgiveness, reconciliation, positive social identities, and increased faith in the 
fairness of the current system. Philpot and Hornsey (in press) found that government 
apologies did not promote intergroup forgiveness. Earlier, I discussed how apologies and 
compensation may promote reconciliation in the form of more positive intergroup feelings. 
Social identity theory suggests another potential benefit of apologies and compensation. 
According to social identity theory (Tajfel & Turner, 1986), people are motivated to think 
highly of the groups to which they belong. However, a historical injustice implies that society 
has a low regard for the victimized group. Consider how Japanese Canadians may have felt 
during the more than 40 years that it took the Canadian government to apologize for Japanese 
internment. Their country abused their family, friends, or ancestors because of their Japanese 
heritage. Because of this, they may feel that Canadian society does not value Japanese 
Canadians. An apology can help assuage these identity concerns. A content analysis of 
political apologies revealed that governments usually emphasize the magnitude of the 
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injustice, express remorse for it, and promise to work to prevent future similar occurrences 
(Blatz et al., 2008). The government may, therefore, reduce concerns by the previously 
victimized minority that the present government does not value their group. By offering 
compensation, the government indicates that these promises are sincere (Minow, 2002). The 
content analysis of political apologies also revealed that political apologies explicitly praise 
the previously victimized minority‘s achievements (Blatz et al., 2008). By praising their 
group‘s accomplishments, an apology may lead members of a historically victimized minority 
to feel more accepted by society. They may, thus, evaluate their group more positively and 
feel more identified with the broader society after an apology and compensation are offered.  
Another framework that informs this discussion includes theories of justice motivation 
such as the just world hypothesis (Lerner, 1980) and system justification theory (Jost & 
Banaji, 1994; Jost & Hunyady, 2005; Kay, Jost, Mandisodza and colleagues, 2007). Justice 
theorists propose that people are motivated to believe that their social world and political 
system are fair. Historical wrongs imply that the current system is capable of unjust actions; if 
the system acted unjustly in the past, it may very well act unjustly in the future. A political 
apology can lessen this threat. Governments often explicitly praise the fairness of the current 
system in their apologies (Blatz et al., 2008). Also, political apologies often dissociate the old 
society from the present society (Blatz et al., 2008; Goffman, 1971). Governments emphasize 
that the injustice occurred long ago, when the country was very different from what it is today. 
When he apologized for the Chinese Head Tax, Stephen Harper stated that the tax ―was a 
product of a profoundly different time‖ and ―lies far in our past‖ (―Harper‘s Speech,‖ 2006). 
By dissociating the past and the present, the government establishes that, although a past 
government mistreated the minority, the current government, and by implication the majority 
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group, recognizes that these actions are wrong. Also, by offering even symbolic financial 
compensation, governments indicate that they sincerely want to change the current system. 
Compensation sometimes even attempts to make up for the harms caused by the injustice, 
even if only to a meager extent. Thus, apologies and compensation for historical injustices 
may increase victimized minorities‘ endorsement of the system.  
Discussions of political apologies and compensation focus, quite naturally, on how 
these offers promote favorable intergroup feelings, a sense of justice, and positive identities 
for the victimized minority (e.g., Minow, 2002); however, the implications of an apology and 
compensation for the majority group should be considered as well. Past injustices were 
popular among the majority group at the time. For example, the Chinese Head Tax was 
imposed because of fears among many Canadians that Chinese laborers were taking jobs that 
rightfully belonged to European Canadians (Dyzenhaus & Moran, 2005). A reminder of racist 
attitudes and prejudicial actions amongst their ancestors can threaten the social identity of 
majority group members (Branscombe & Doosje, 2004). Also, past discrimination committed 
by the government can threaten the majority‘s belief that their system is fair and just (Blatz et 
al., 2008).  
Political apologies may have the same benefits for the majority‘s feelings of justice 
and evaluation of their group as they do for the minority. In political apologies, governments 
often praise the majority group, affirm the fairness of the system (Blatz et al., 2008), and 
dissociate present members of the majority from their predecessors. By praising the majority 
group, apologies can boost the majority‘s positive evaluation of their group. By affirming the 
commitment to justice of the present government and dissociating the past from the present, 
apologies can protect the majority‘s positive evaluations of their system. By offering 
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compensation, governments can signal to the majority that they sincerely want to change the 
system and offset the harms caused by the injustice. Thus, when a government apologizes and 
offers compensation, the majority group might feel more favorable towards their group, more 
identified with their group, and more positive towards their system, just like the aggrieved 
minority might.  
 Finally, when the government commits injustices, people often rationalize the injustice 
by refusing to sympathize with the victims, blaming, and sometimes derogating them (Hafer 
& Begue, 2003; Haynes & Olson, 2006; Lerner, 1980). Apologies emphasize the innocence of 
the victims. Also, apologies often praise the system, while compensation demonstrates that the 
government is committed to restoring justice. Consequently, apologies and compensation 
might decrease any tendency for members of the majority group to justify the system by 
blaming, derogating, or withholding sympathy from the victims of an injustice. 
Why Apologies and Compensation May Be Inconsequential 
So far, I have discussed how apologies and compensation may improve the judgments 
about one‘s own and the other group for the previously victimized minority and the majority. 
There are, however, reasons to predict that these offers will not be psychologically beneficial. 
Previously victimized minority group members are likely aware that apologies and 
compensation offers are gestures that cannot completely overcome past suffering (Minow, 
1998). Even if the government offers a strong apology and extensive compensation, 
victimized minorities may be aware that these actions cannot correct for the harm their group 
suffered. Similarly, historically mistreated minority group members may reactively devalue 
offers of apologies and compensation (L. Ross & Ward, 1995). That is, previously victimized 
minority groups will find apologies and compensation less satisfactory once they are offered 
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compared to before they are offered (I discuss reactive devaluation more thoroughly below). 
Apologies and compensation may, thus, be ineffective because the victimized group notices 
their deficiencies or reactively devalues them.  
There are also reasons an offer of apology and compensation may not affect the 
majority group‘s intergroup feelings, social identification, or endorsement of the system. Past 
research demonstrates that advantaged group members go to great lengths to justify 
mistreatment and inequality. They minimize the consequences of the injustice, blame or 
derogate the victim, or deny that the current system is responsible for the wrong (see Hafer & 
Begue, 2003; Haynes & Olson, 2006; Jost & Hunyady, 2005; Lerner, 1980). Thus, apologies 
and compensation for historical harms may not have an impact on the majority group because 
they have minimized any potential threats these past harms hold.  
An apology and compensation can potentially increase perceived threats amongst the 
majority. Many members of the nonvictimized majority debate whether the current 
government is responsible for redressing the actions of past governments. Some, including 
former Australian Prime Minister John Howard, think that it is illogical to hold present 
governments and groups responsible for redressing past injustices (Thompson, 2002). Since 
the current government did not commit the harm, how can we expect them to apologize and 
pay compensation for it? On the other hand, some scholars argue that the passage of time does 
not expunge a country from responsibility for its misdeeds (Thompson, 2002). Thus, it is 
debatable whether the current government and group are responsible for redressing past 
wrongs. By apologizing, the government explicitly establishes that the current group is 
responsible for addressing the harm (Blatz et al., 2008); therefore, an apology may increase 
any potential threat the injustice poses to justice and identity beliefs.  
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In sum, it is not straightforward whether a government apology for past harms would 
promote more positive intergroup feelings, enhanced social identities, and greater faith in the 
social system. The studies reported in this thesis attempted to shed light on these issues. I also 
examined the conditions under which the previously victimized minority and majority group 
would or would not support an apology and compensation. I discuss this issue below.  
Who Values Apologies and Compensation?  
Despite the potential benefits, politicians often resist apologies and compensation 
offers because they fear a political backlash from the majority group. Bill Clinton cited hostile 
responses amongst the majority as the primary reason why he did not support an apology for 
slavery (Brooks, 1999). Some polling data suggests that a backlash is a legitimate concern. A 
2002 Gallup poll (Viles, 2002) asked a sample of White and African Americans if the 
government should offer financial compensation for slavery. Nearly all (90%) White 
Americans sampled opposed this suggestion, whereas a slim majority of African Americans 
(55%) supported the idea. Similarly, a poll conducted by ABC News in 2000 revealed that 
53% of White Americans opposed an apology for slavery, whereas 66% of African Americans 
supported the idea (―Polling Report,‖ 2008). In the face of moderate to unanimous opposition 
amongst the majority and moderate support amongst the previously victimized minority, it is 
not surprising that politicians wonder whether apologies and compensation are worth the 
potential political costs. Nevertheless, there is little empirical evidence that offering apologies 
and compensation elicits a backlash. Instead, there are theoretical reasons to believe that 
majority groups will support apologies and compensation more after they are offered 
compared to before.  
 
 14 
First of all, people are motivated to justify their political and economic systems (Kay 
et al., 2007). Before governments offer apologies and compensation majority group members 
will justify the system by opposing these measures. But, once governments offer apologies 
and compensation, majority group members can justify the system by supporting these 
measures.  
Research on negotiation sheds further light on this discussion. In political negotiations, 
people tend to evaluate their own side‘s offers more favorably than equivalent offers made by 
the opposition (G. Cohen, 2003; Curhan, Neale & L. Ross, 2004; Maoz, Ward, Katz, & L. 
Ross, 2002; L. Ross & Ward, 1995). For example, Maoz and colleagues (2002) found that 
Israeli respondents evaluated a peace plan allegedly proposed by Israeli leaders more 
favorably than the identical plan allegedly proposed by Palestinian leaders. Lee Ross, Ward 
and colleagues often explain these findings in terms of cognitive consistency theories such as 
balance theory (Heider, 1958). Their analysis is relevant to the present discussion.  
 Balance theory (Heider, 1958) proposes that the valence one associates with an action 
is affected by the valence one associates with the actor(s). Governments offer apologies on 
behalf of the majority group, and use the majority group‘s tax dollars to pay for compensation. 
Members of the majority group likely possess a more positive attitude towards their own 
group, relative to the previously victimized minority (Tajfel & Turner, 1986). To maintain 
psychological balance, the majority should oppose apologies and compensation that the 
government refuses to offer on behalf of the majority group. On the other hand, the majority 
should support apologies and compensation the government offers on their behalf. In both 
cases, the majority would maintain psychological balance between their positive evaluations 
of their group and actions taken by individuals representing their group. Thus, balance theory 
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predicts that the majority group‘s evaluations of the apology and compensation should 
increase after they are offered relative to before.  
On the other hand, the previously victimized minority‘s support for apologies and 
compensation might, if anything, decrease after they are offered compared to before. Research 
on reactive devaluation (e.g., L. Ross & Ward, 1995) is relevant to explaining how the 
minority group will evaluate the apology and compensation. Reactive devaluation ―refers to 
the fact that the very act of offering a particular proposal or concession may diminish its 
apparent value or attractiveness in the eyes of the recipient‖ (L. Ross & Ward, p. 270). Across 
many domains Lee Ross and colleagues have shown that the recipients of an offer in political 
negotiations typically value the offer less once it is offered, compared to before it was offered. 
Ross and Ward explain their results partially in terms of cognitive consistency theories such as 
balance theory (Heider, 1958) – recipients try to maintain balance between their less favorable 
evaluations of a group and that group‘s actions – but also in terms of rational deduction – 
people deduce that their adversaries are making this offer or concession because it advantages 
them. Whatever the cause, reactive devaluation suggests that the previously victimized 
minority will evaluate an apology or compensation less favorably once it is offered compared 
to before it was offered.  
Balance theory suggests that the degree to which a historically victimized group 
reactively devalues a government‘s offer will be determined by how positively or negatively 
the historically victimized minority evaluates the government and majority group. If the 
historically victimized group has an objectively negative attitude towards the government or 
majority, reactive devaluation should be strong. To maintain psychological balance between 
their negative attitude towards this group and this group‘s actions, historically victimized 
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minorities will devalue the offer. However, if the historically victimized group evaluates the 
government and majority positively, reactive devaluation should be minimal, or may not occur 
at all. To maintain psychological balance between their somewhat positive attitude towards 
this group and this group‘s actions, they should value the offer.  
The reactive devaluation analysis suggests that, assuming that the majority feels more 
positive towards the majority than the victimized minority does (Tajfel & Turner, 1986), the 
majority groups evaluations of a redress offer will increase, and the previously victimized 
minority‘s evaluations will decrease, from before to after that offer is made. It is less clear 
whether the previously victimized minority will evaluate apologies and compensation more or 
less favorably compared to the majority. Before redress is offered, do victimized minorities 
evaluate it more or as favorably as the majority? After redress is offered, do victimized 
minorities evaluate it less or as favorably as the majority? A straightforward generalization 
from balance theory would predict opposite reactions from the majority and minority groups. 
Because the majority evaluates their own group more favorably than the previously victimized 
minority does, members of the majority group should evaluate an offer the government 
refuses to offer less favorably than the minority does. Conversely, when the government offers 
an apology and compensation on behalf of the majority, they should evaluate these actions 
more favorably than the previously victimized minority. However, a number of other factors 
likely contribute to the relative evaluations of the majority and previously victimized minority, 
such as the time that has passed since the injustice, how favorably the majority and previously 
victimized minority evaluate each other, the magnitude of original the harm, and the degree to 
which the original harm contributes to present-day inequalities and disadvantages the minority 
group suffers (Starzyk & M. Ross, 2008). Thus, the relative evaluation of the majority and 
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previously victimized minority may depend on particular circumstances. All else being equal, 
however, balance theory would predict that, compared to the previously victimized minority, 
the majority should report less favorable evaluations of the apology and compensation before, 
and more favorable evaluations after, any offer is made.  
Effects of Apologies or Compensation Offered Alone  
 So far, I have discussed offers of apologies and compensation as if they always 
accompany each other. However, governments sometimes apologize without offering 
compensation (e.g., the American government‘s apology to native Hawaiians for annexing 
their land; ―Apology Passed‖ 1993), or offer financial compensation without an apology (e.g., 
the Canadian government‘s reparations package for residential schools; Bisset, 2007). What 
effect does offering apologies or compensation alone have? On the surface, any offer seems 
better than no offer at all. However, Minow discusses the importance of offering apologies 
and compensation together (Minow, 2002). She suggests that an apology that is not 
accompanied by compensation will seem cheap and insincere, while compensation 
unaccompanied by an apology implies that the majority group is trying to buy its way out of 
guilt, rather than expressing sincere remorse (Minow, 2002; see also Steele, 1990).  
Research and theorizing on reactive devaluation provides further psychological insight 
into the effects of apologies without compensation, and compensation without apology 
(Curhan et al., 2004; Maoz et al., 2002; L. Ross & Ward, 1995). Ross and his colleagues 
propose that when negotiators offer less than the potential recipients demand, the recipients 
devalue the aspects that are offered and enhance their subjective evaluation of the aspects that 
are withheld. For example, Ross and Ward (1995) asked university students to imagine that 
they had worked for a professor over the summer. Participants read that this professor later 
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published a book chapter based partially on the student‘s work without offering the student 
either authorship or a share of the payment received from the publisher. The students also 
imagined that they had demanded that the professor give them part of that payment and third 
authorship on the paper as compensation. Finally, half of the participants were then asked to 
imagine that the professor offered them third authorship; the other half were asked to imagine 
that the professor offered them part of the cash payment. The students who imagined being 
offered third authorship subsequently rated the cash payment as more valuable than the third 
authorship. In contrast, the students who imagined being offered cash payments rated the third 
authorship as more valuable than the cash payments. The authors attribute their results to 
reactance (Brehm, 1966). According to reactance theory (Brehm, 1966; Curhan et al., 2004), 
people value objects that are unavailable more than objects that are readily available. Thus, 
when students were offered cash payments, but not an authorship, they increased the value of 
the authorship because it was no longer available to them.  
Applied to the domain of historical redress, the processes Minow and Ross discuss 
suggest that apologies without compensation or compensation without apologies will be 
ineffective for the previously victimized minority. When something that the historically 
victimized group asks for is withheld, the victimized group will come to regard the withheld 
option as more valuable, and the option that is offered as less valuable. Furthermore, Minow 
suggests that, since an apology without compensation will seem insincere, and compensation 
without an apology will seem manipulative, an apology or compensation offered alone will be 
worse than no redress at all.  
The processes Minow and Ross discuss focus on the recipients of redress offers, in this 
case the previously victimized minority, but what about the majority group? Once again, past 
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scholarship on apologies and compensation provides little insight into how majority group 
members will react to apologies and compensation offered alone. However, according to 
reactance theory, people should only demonstrate reactance when something is made scarce to 
them or their group (Brehm, 1966). When an apology or compensation is not offered to the 
previously victimized minority, the majority should still value this offer because nothing has 
been made scarce to them. Further, system justification (Kay et al., 2007) suggests that 
majority group members will value an offer of apology or compensation offered alone because 
they are motivated to justify their government‘s actions.  
Thesis Overview 
I propose that, to gain a full appreciation of apologies and compensation, it is 
important to study their effects in controlled settings and assess their implications on a variety 
of measures. In this thesis, I describe four studies that tested whether apologies and 
compensation encourage forgiveness, reconciliation, positive social identities, and increased 
endorsement of the system amongst members of both the previously victimized minority and 
majority groups. In Study 1, I tested the effects of an apology and compensation for the 
Chinese Head Tax among a sample of Chinese Canadians. I recruited participants to the lab 
and asked them to read the history of the Chinese Head Tax (see Appendix A). Participants 
read that many Chinese Canadian groups had demanded that the government apologize and 
offer some type of compensation for the Head Tax. I randomly assigned participants to 
conditions in which they read that the Canadian government had offered nothing (which was 
true at the time), offered only an apology, offered only compensation, or offered both an 
apology and compensation (which it did, but after the study was completed). I then asked 
participants to indicate whether they thought the government should apologize or should offer 
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compensation, complete a forgiveness scale, evaluate Chinese and White Canadians, complete 
scales assessing identity with Canadians and Chinese Canadians, and indicate the extent to 
which the Head Tax reflects poorly on the current Canadian government.  
By collecting the above measures, I could test hypotheses that apologies and 
compensation, offered together, may increase forgiveness and reconciliation, lead to greater 
identification with social groups they belong to, and decrease concern that the past reflects 
poorly on the current system amongst members of the previously victimized minority. Also, 
by including conditions in which only an apology or only compensation was offered, I could 
test predictions derived from reactance theory that the historically victimized group may find 
an apology or compensation offered alone unacceptable. Potentially, an offer of apology or 
compensation alone could lead historically victimized group members to feel less forgiving, 
less identified with Canada, and less positive towards White Canadians compared to not 
offering any redress at all. 
Although most scholars focus on the effects apologies and reparations on the 
previously victimized minority (see Minow, 2002; de Grieff, 2008), it is important to study 
their effects on the majority group. Apologies and compensation may have psychological 
benefits for majority group members who are not personally responsible for the injustice. 
Also, the majority‘s response to the apology and compensation may affect its impact for the 
previously victimized minority. If the majority responds positively to the apology and 
compensation, it may amplify the effects for the previously victimized minority; whereas, a 
negative reaction may undermine the apology and compensation. In Study 2, I recruited non-
Chinese Canadians, and asked them to complete the same paradigm as Study 1. By doing so, I 
tested whether apologies and compensation would have a similar benefit for the majority as it 
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might have for the previously victimized minority. By including the apology only and 
compensation only conditions, I tested the hypothesis that majority group members will find 
an apology or compensation offered alone to be as effective as an apology and compensation 
offered together.   
On June 22, 2006 the Canadian government offered an apology and compensation for 
the Chinese Head Tax (―Compensation Offered,‖ 2006). Study 3 was a quasi-experiment in 
which I surveyed a sample of Chinese and non-Chinese Canadians before and after this offer. 
I evaluated whether this offer would lead to more positive intergroup feelings, higher 
identification with Canadians and Chinese Canadians, and increased faith in the social system. 
I also asked participants to evaluate the apology and compensation after the offer was made. 
This measure tested the hypothesis that majority group members would evaluate an apology 
and compensation more favorably than previously victimized minority group members would. 
Study 4 was an experimental replication of study 3. I randomly assigned Chinese and non-
Chinese participants to read or not read the actual apology and compensation offer made by 
the Canadian government for the Head Tax. I tested whether this apology and compensation 
package would improve intergroup feelings, lead to higher identification with Canadians and 
Chinese Canadians, and increase faith in the justice of their social system. In this study I also 
asked participants to evaluate the apology both before and after it was offered. This was the 
only study in which I had both the majority and previously victimized minority groups 
evaluate an apology and compensation offer both when it had or had not been offered. I tested 
the hypothesis that majority group members will evaluate a redress offer more favorably after 
it is offered compared to before, whereas previously victimized group members will reactively 
devalue that apology when it is offered.  
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To summarize, in the present studies, I tried to achieve four goals. First, I analyzed 
how favorably majority and previously victimized minority groups would evaluate apologies 
and compensation when they were or were not offered. Specifically, I wanted to determine if, 
given that majority group members often oppose redress measures before they are offered, the 
majority group would evidence a backlash against an offer of redress. Based on system 
justification theory, reactive devaluation and balance theory, I predicted that the majority 
group‘s evaluation of an apology and compensation would be more favorable after these 
redress measures were offered compared to before. Second, I examined if apologies and 
compensation, when offered together, could promote forgiveness, increase reconciliation, lead 
to more favorable evaluations of social identities, and diminish concerns that the past harm 
reflects poorly on the present system amongst previously victimized minority group members. 
Third, I tested if majority group members would show more positive intergroup feelings, more 
positive evaluations of their group, and increased faith in the fairness of the social system. 
Finally, I assessed how both minority and majority group members would react to an apology 




I recruited Canadian participants of Chinese ancestry and experimentally varied 
whether or not the government had provided an apology, financial compensation, both, or 
neither for the Chinese Head Tax. This study concluded more than a year before the Canadian 
government apologized and offered compensation for the Head Tax (―Compensation 
Offered,‖ 2006). In pilot testing I determined that participants were generally unaware of the 
history of the Head Tax at the time of the study.  
After reading the passage, participants first indicated whether they thought the 
government should offer (or should have offered) an apology or compensation. Afterwards, 
participants completed a popular forgiveness scale modified for this situation (McCullough, 
Rachal, Sandage, Worthington, Brown, & Hight, 1998). Participants then completed measures 
of identity with Canadians and Chinese Canadians, and evaluated White Canadians and 
Chinese Canadians on thermometer scales. I also assessed the extent to which participants 
perceived that the Head Tax reflects poorly on the current system of government. Collecting 
these measures allowed me to test these hypotheses:  
Hypothesis 1: (1a) Chinese Canadians will devalue whatever is offered by the 
government. When an apology is offered, participants‘ support for the apology should 
decrease. When compensation is offered, support for the compensation should decrease. (1b) 
Based on reactance, I predicted that, when an apology is offered alone, support for the 
compensation should increase, and, when compensation is offered alone, support for the 
apology should increase.  
Hypothesis 2: (2a) Chinese Canadians will feel as forgiving of White Canadians after 
an apology and compensation are offered compared to when neither are offered. Past research 
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has demonstrated that apologies for intergroup harms do not lead to forgiveness (Philpot & 
Hornsey, in press), and many scholars write that it is illogical to expect apologies to do so 
(Minow, 1998; de Grieff, 2008). I also predicted that (2b) Chinese Canadians will feel less 
forgiving towards White Canadians when an apology or compensation are offered alone 
compared to when neither or both are offered because previously victimized minority group 
members will consider such offers manipulative or insincere (Minow, 2002).  
Hypothesis 3: (3a) Chinese Canadians will evaluate White Canadians more favorably 
when both an apology and compensation are offered compared to when neither are offered. 
This increase will occur because Chinese Canadians feel more reconciled with White 
Canadians. (3b) Chinese Canadians will evaluate White Canadians less favorably then an 
apology or compensation are offered alone compared to when neither or both are offered.  
Hypothesis 4:  Chinese Canadians will feel more positive towards Chinese Canadians 
when an apology and compensation are offered compared to when neither are offered because 
they feel that their group is more accepted by society. I did not predict that offers of apologies 
or compensation alone would affect evaluations of Chinese Canadians. Receiving less than 
one‘s group has demanded from another group should not affect evaluations of one‘s own 
group.  
Hypothesis 5: (5a) Chinese Canadians will feel more identified with Canadians when 
both an apology and compensation are offered because it affirms their Canadian social 
identity. (5b) Chinese Canadians will feel less identified with Canadians when an apology or 
compensation are offered alone because they will distance themselves from a group that 
makes a cheap or insincere offer (Minow, 2002).  
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Hypothesis 6: Chinese Canadians will identify more with Chinese Canadians when 
both an apology and compensation are offered. I did not predict that offers of apologies or 
compensation alone would affect identity with Chinese Canadians. 
Hypothesis 7: (7a) Chinese Canadians will believe that the Head Tax reflects less 
poorly on the government after an apology and compensation. (7b) Chinese Canadians will 
think that the Head Tax reflects more poorly on the government when an apology or 
compensation are offered alone compared to when neither are offered. 
Method 
Participants   
One hundred twenty-five Canadian University students of Chinese ancestry (78 
women) received either course credit or eight dollars for their participation. In post 
experimental debriefing, one woman reported knowing that neither an apology nor 
compensation had been offered; her data were excluded from analyses. Due to experimenter 
error, seven participants received a questionnaire omitting the forgiveness and identification 
with China measures. The data from these participants are included in the analyses of the 
remaining measures.  
Procedure 
In small groups of 1 to 8, participants read about the Chinese Head Tax (see Appendix 
A to see the passage they read). Participants were informed that Chinese Canadian 
organizations have demanded that the government apologize and offer financial compensation 
for the discrimination. The details in the passage were accurate, except for the claims in some 
versions that the government had offered an apology, financial compensation, or both. Recall 
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that, at the time, no apology or compensation had been offered. The compensation package I 
invented was modeled on the one provided to Japanese Canadians for their internment during 
World War II. Compensation included direct payments of $20,000 to head tax payers or their 
families, a fund to educate Canadians about the Head Tax, and a race relations fund to foster 
efforts to prevent similar acts in the future. Even though I ran this study before the 
compensation was actually offered, this fabricated compensation offer was similar to the 
package that was eventually offered (―Compensation Offered,‖ 2006; see Appendix B). The 
major difference was that the compensation package I fabricated offered cash payments to 
descendants if the Head Tax payer and their spouse had died, while the Canadian 
government‘s offer did not include this stipulation.  
Dependent measures.  After reading the passage, participants were asked to indicate 
their agreement with two items assessing support for apology and compensation: ―The 
Canadian Government should apologize for the mistreatment of Chinese immigrants‖ and 
―The Canadian Government should make cash payments to descendants of those affected by 
the mistreatment of Chinese immigrants.‖ Participants were also asked to indicate their 
agreement on 7-point scales with statements in a four-item forgiveness scale (α = .65), adapted 
from McCullough and colleagues‘ (1998) measure of interpersonal forgiveness. The 
statements assessed participants‘ tendency to distrust and avoid white Canadians: ―I don‘t 
trust White Canadians‖; ―I avoid White Canadians‖; ―I stay away from White Canadians as 
much as possible‖; ―I live as if White Canadians don‘t exist, aren‘t around.‖ I recoded items 
so higher numbers indicated more forgiveness. Participants then evaluated White and Chinese 
Canadians on 100-point thermometer evaluation measures with endpoints labeled 0 (extremely 
unfavorable) and 100 (extremely favorable). Participants also indicated on seven-point 
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disagree-agree scales the extent to which they agreed that ―[t]he mistreatment of Chinese 
Canadians reflects poorly on the federal government.‖ Finally, participants completed 
measures of identification with Canadians and Chinese Canadians on a measure adapted from 
Spears, Doosje, and Ellemers (1997). Participants indicated how much ―I see myself as 
(Chinese) Canadian‖, ―I am pleased to be (Chinese) Canadian‖, ―I feel strong ties with other 
(Chinese) Canadians‖, and ―I identify with other (Chinese) Canadians‖ on a seven-point scale 
with endpoints labeled (1) not at all and (7) very much (α = .90 for identity with Canadians; α 
= .83 for identity with Chinese Canadians).  
Results 
I analyzed the data in 2 (apology: no, yes) x 2 (compensation: no, yes) analyses of 
variance (ANOVAs). Whenever I found a significant two-way interaction, I conducted simple 
effects tests using the pooled error terms and degrees of freedom. Means and standard 
deviations are displayed in Table 1.  
Apology Support.  Support for apology was quite high overall (M = 6.38 out of 7.00, 
SD = 0.87). Contrary to the prediction of reactive devaluation, Chinese Canadian participants 
were more in favor of an apology after it was offered (M = 6.65, SD = 0.58) compared to 
before (M = 6.06, SD = 1.01), F(1, 121) = 15.06, p < .001, partial η
2 
= .11. Neither the main 
effect of compensation, F < 1, nor the interaction, F < 1, was significant. There was no 




Compensation Support.  Support for the compensation was moderately high overall (M 
= 5.29 out of 7.00, SD = 1.47). Again, contrary to the prediction of reactive devaluation, 
Chinese Canadian participants supported the compensation more when it was offered (M = 
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4.93, SD = 1.46) than when it was not (M = 5.71, SD = 1.39), F(1, 121) =9.17, p < .01, partial 
η
2 
= .07. Neither the main effect of apology, F < 1, nor the interaction, F < 1, was significant. 
There was no evidence for the reactance prediction that support for compensation increases 
when an apology is offered alone.   
Forgiveness.  Overall, participants felt quite forgiving (M = 6.47 out of 7.00, SD = 
0.64), but that is likely a result of the extremity of the statements participants were asked to 
disagree or agree with. Forgiveness was lower whenever apology or compensation were 
offered alone than when neither or both were offered. The interaction was significant, F (1, 
113) = 3.96, p < .05, partial η
2 
= .03. The compensation only condition did not differ from 
baseline, F(1, 113) < 1, but in the apology only condition participants felt marginally less 
forgiving than if nothing had been offered, F(1, 113) = 3.56, p = .06, partial η
2 
= .05. The 
combination of apology and compensation appeared somewhat effective in that it increased 
forgiveness of White Canadians compared to the apology only condition, F(1, 113) = 5.75, p 
= .02, partial η
2 
= .08. However, the combination of apology and compensation failed to 
increase forgiveness significantly beyond the compensation only, F(1, 113) < 1, or the 
baseline no apology-no compensation conditions, F(1, 113) < 1.
3
  
Evaluation of White Canadians.  Overall, participants evaluated White Canadians 
favorably (M = 74.27 out of 100.00, SD = 17.37). Evaluation of White Canadians was not 
affected by whether an apology, compensation, or both were offered (Fs < 2.1, ps > .16).  
Evaluation of Chinese Canadians. Overall, participants, all of whom were Chinese 
Canadian, evaluated Chinese Canadians favorably (M = 74.43 out of 100.00, SD = 15.43), 
about as favorably as they evaluated White Canadians. Evaluation of Chinese Canadians was 
not affected by whether an apology, compensation or both were offered (Fs < 2.4, ps >.12). 
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Identification with Canadians. Identification with Canadians was generally high (M = 
5.27, SD = 1.27), but was lower whenever apology or compensation were offered alone than 
when neither or both were offered. The two-way interaction on the identification composite 
was marginally significant, F(1, 120) = 3.54, p = .06, partial η
2 
= .05. None of the simple 
effects approached significance.   
Identification with Chinese Canadians. Identification with Chinese Canadians was 
generally high (M = 6.11, SD = 0.88) and no effects of the manipulations attained significance 
(all Fs < 2.3, all ps > .13).
4
  
Reflection on Federal Government.  Overall, participants thought the Head Tax 
reflected poorly on the federal government (M = 5.27 out of 7.00, SD = 1.27). Scores on this 
measure were not affected by condition (Fs < 1, ps > .47).  
Discussion 
I experimentally manipulated whether an apology and compensation, offered alone or 
together leads to forgiveness, reconciliation, improved social identity, and increased faith in 
the social system amongst members of a historically victimized group. There was no evidence 
that offering both an apology and compensation affected any of these measures compared to 
not offering any redress at all. This experiment replicates the results of previous studies, 
which find no effects of government apologies on forgiveness of groups (Philpot & Hornsey, 
in press). It also demonstrates that apologies do not alter other variables for the previously 
victimized minority.  
It is possible that I did not observe any increases on these measures because of ceiling 
effects. Chinese Canadians responded close to as positively as they could on the measures of 
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forgiveness and identity with Chinese Canadians, and were well above the midpoint on most 
other measures. Apologies and compensation may not have increased scores on these 
measures in this study because it is not possible for Chinese Canadians to feel any more 
positively. In studies 3 and 4, I used measures of identity that participants would not score as 
highly on to examine if I would observe effects of an apology and compensation when ceiling 
issues were reduced.  
As predicted by Minow (2002) and reactance theory (Brehm, 1966), historically 
victimized group members reacted negatively to apologies without compensation and 
compensation without apology. Participants felt less forgiving and less identified with 
Canadians when an apology or compensation were offered alone than when an apology was 
offered with compensation or when neither an apology nor compensation were offered. 
However, only occasionally were the individual comparisons statistically significant. Thus, it 
appears that previously victimized minority groups react negatively to only receiving part of 
what they demand. In this circumstance, receiving something is not better than receiving 
nothing.  
Contrary to the predictions of reactive devaluation (e.g., L. Ross & Ward, 1995), 
offering an apology increased support for apology, and offering compensation increased 
support for compensation. Perhaps there was no evidence for reactive devaluation in this study 
because I assessed support for apologies and compensation instead of satisfaction, as past 
research on reactive devaluation has (e.g., Maoz et al., 2002). It is possible that minority 
groups are dissatisfied with an apology once it is offered compared to before, but still think 
that the government should have offered it. I test this possibility in studies 3 and 4. 
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To summarize, an apology and compensation for a historical injustice had little benefit 
for the previously victimized minority when offered together. When offered alone, providing 
an apology or compensation appeared to be somewhat harmful to the previously victimized 
minority‘s feelings of forgiveness and identification with Canadians. It remains to be seen if 
an apology and compensation offer could have beneficial effects for the majority group on 





 Study 2 followed the exact same procedures as Study 1, but this time I recruited a 
sample of participants who did not share an identity with the victimized group (non-Chinese 
Canadians) and removed the forgiveness and identification with Chinese Canadians scales. As 
in Study 1, I manipulated whether an apology, financial compensation, both, or neither was 
offered for the Head tax. Study 2 tested the following hypotheses:  
Hypothesis 1: Participants will support an offer of redress more after it is made. Thus, 
I predicted that (1a) support for apology would increase when an apology is offered compared 
to when it is not, and (1b) support for compensation will increase when compensation is 
offered compared to when it is not.  
Hypothesis 2: Participants, the majority of whom are White Canadians, will evaluate 
White Canadians more favorably when either an apology, compensation, or both are offered 
compared to when neither are offered, as predicted by social identity theory. 
Hypothesis 3:  Participants would be less motivated to protect the system of 
government by derogating the victim group (Haynes & Olson 2006) when an apology, 
compensation, or both are offered. Therefore, they should evaluate Chinese Canadians more 
favorably when some form of government redress is offered than when nothing is offered.  
Hypothesis 4: Participants will identify more highly with Canadians when some form 
of redress is offered because the redress affirms their Canadian social identity directly by 
praising Canadians, and indirectly by dissociating past Canadians who acted unjustly from 
present Canadians. 
Hypothesis 5: Participants will believe that the Head Tax reflects less poorly on the 
government after redress is offered. Participants will dissociate the government from the 
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injustice because the government explicitly dissociates the current system from the past 




One hundred and nineteen Canadian university students (65 women) who were not of 
Chinese descent received either course credit or eight dollars for their participation. When 
asked to report ethnicity, 72 people chose White, 27 Asian (but not Chinese), 10 chose East 
Indian, three Black, two Aboriginal, and five chose other.  
Procedure  
The procedure for Study 2 was identical to Study 1, except that the forgiveness scale 
and identity with Chinese Canadians scale were removed. All other materials were identical. 
The identification with Canadians scale was internally consistent (α = .89). 
Results 
Responses were submitted to 2 (apology) x 2 (compensation) ANOVAs. I also 
conducted planned comparisons between the baseline no-redress condition and the other three 
conditions – apology alone, compensation alone, and apology and compensation – for all 
measures except for support for apology and support for compensation measures. Means and 
standard deviations are presented in Table 2. 
Apology Support.  Support for apology was quite high overall (M = 6.28 out of 7.00, 
SD = 1.16). Although it appears that participants supported an apology more after it was 
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offered compared to before, the apology main effect was not significant, F(1, 114) = 1.93, p = 
.17, partial η
2 
= .02, nor was the main effect of compensation, F < 1 or the interaction, F < 1. 
Because support for the apology was so high, the null result may reflect a ceiling effect. To 
provide a more sensitive test of the hypothesis, I conducted non-parametric analyses. I 
recoded responses to the support question to create a categorical variable. If participants 
indicated ‗agree‘ or ‗strongly agree‘, they were coded as high supporters of the apology. If 
participants responded ‗somewhat agree‘, ‗neutral‘, or ‗disagree‘ (only 6 out of 119 
participants disagreed to any extent), they were coded as low supporters. In the no apology 
condition, 77% of participants were high supporters of the apology, as compared to 90% in the 
apology condition, χ
2
(1) = 3.67, p = .055.  
Compensation Support.  Support for the compensation was moderate overall (M = 4.45 
out of 7.00, SD = 1.89). Support for compensation was not affected by any of the 
manipulations (all Fs < 1.8, ps > .17).  
Evaluation of White Canadians.  Overall, participants, the majority of whom were 
White Canadians, evaluated White Canadians favorably (M = 74.27 out of 100.00, SD = 
17.37). No main effects or interactions were significant in the ANOVA (Fs < 2.6, ps > .10). 
However, the comparison between the baseline no redress condition (M = 70.56, SD = 18.26) 
and the combined apology and compensation was significant (M = 79.28, SD = 14.28), F(1, 
115) = 3.73, p = .05, partial η
2 
= .07. Participants felt more positive towards White Canadians 
when the government apologized and offered compensation to Chinese Canadians for the 
Head Tax compared to when they offered nothing. No other contrasts were significant (Fs < 
2.5, ps > .13). 
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It may make sense to only do this analysis including Canadians of European heritage. 
Doing the analysis this way reveals no main effects or interactions in the 2 (apology) by 2 
(compensation) ANOVA (all Fs > 2.0, all ps < .17). Replicating the contrast above Canadians, 
European Canadians evaluated White Canadians more positively when both an apology and 
compensation were offered (M = 83.36, SD = 11.33) than when neither were offered, (M = 
75.42, SD = 11.17), but the contrast was not significant, F(1, 65) = 2.13, p = .15, partial η
2 
= 
.11. Notice that the effect size in the analysis excluding non-European Canadians is larger 
than in the analysis including these participants. Thus, the null effect in the analysis that only 
includes self-identified European Canadian participants is most likely non-significant because 
of reduced statistical power. 
 
Evaluation of Chinese Canadians. Overall, participants evaluated Chinese Canadians 
favorably (M = 68.81 out of 100.00, SD = 17.26), but less favorably than they evaluated White 
Canadians. No main effects, interactions, or planned comparisons were significant (Fs < 2.9, 
ps > .09).  
Identification with Canadians. Overall, identification with Canadians was high (M = 
5.96 out of 7.00, SD = 1.11). No main effects, interactions, or planned comparisons were 
significant (Fs < 2.0, ps > .20).   
Reflection on Government. Overall, participants thought the Head Tax reflected poorly 
on the government (M = 5.47 out of 7.00, SD = 1.38). Participants reported that the Head Tax 
reflected less poorly on the federal government when an apology was offered (M = 5.21, SD = 
1.53) than when it was not (M = 5.75, SD = 1.14), F(1, 115) = 4.80, p = .03, partial η
2 
= .04. 




Little past scholarship has examined how majority group members respond to 
apologies and compensation for historical injustices. In the little that has, some scholars and 
politicians have expressed concerns that majority group members will evidence a backlash 
against an offer of apology and compensation (e.g., Brooks, 1999). In this study, I 
experimentally tested how members of the majority group respond to offers of apology and 
compensation for a historical injustice. Majority group members supported the apology more 
after it was offered compared to when it was not offered. There were no effects for support for 
compensation. There is, thus, no evidence of a backlash against a redress offer amongst the 
majority group in this study. Rather, offering an apology increased support for the apology 
amongst the majority.  
I also tested whether an apology and compensation would improve how favorably 
majority group members evaluated White and Chinese Canadians. Majority group members 
evaluated White Canadians (the majority group) more favorably after an apology and 
compensation compared to when nothing was offered. There were no effects on evaluations of 
Chinese Canadians. I also tested whether an apology and compensation would dissociate the 
present system of government from the Head Tax. Majority group members reported that the 
Head Tax reflected less poorly on their government if the government apologized than if it did 
not, regardless of whether that apology was accompanied by compensation.  
Combined, the results of the first two studies suggest that majority group members 
respond more favorably towards apologies and compensation, offered either alone or together, 
than do members of the aggrieved minority. While the majority group evaluated their own 
group more positively and dissociated the current government from the Head Tax after 
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redress, members of the aggrieved minority‘s scores on these measures were not affected by a 
joint offer of apology and compensation. Rather, for the victimized minority an offer of 
apology or compensation alone seemed harmful, reducing feelings of forgiveness and 
identification with Canadians.  
Study 2 reveals that majority group members prefer apology to compensation. 
Majority group members supported the apology much more than they supported 
compensation, particularly after the apology was offered. Also, an offer of apology led 
majority group members to dissociate the government from the Head Tax, while 
compensation had no effect. On the other hand, in Study 1, the previously victimized minority 
felt less forgiving and less identified with Canada when either an apology or compensation 
were offered alone, but particularly when an apology was offered without compensation. 
These data suggest that the words of praise and ceremony surrounding the apology are enough 
to satisfy the majority. However, the previously victimized minority needs some type of 
substantial penance before they will find a redress offer sincere and acceptable. Words 
without actions were worse than no words at all for the historically victimized group.  
Why is an apology offered alone particularly ineffective for the previously victimized 
minority group? Reactance theory suggests that victimized minority groups react against not 
receiving all that that their group has asked for. Receiving an apology alone should increase 
the minority‘s desire for compensation. However, reactance theory cannot account for why 
minority groups react more negatively to apology without compensation than compensation 
without apology. Perhaps the victimized minority is distrustful of the government because of 
their previous victimization. Historically mistreated group members may need to see 
substantial action before they trust the government‘s words. On the other hand, the majority 
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may trust the government‘s words more because they have not been historically mistreated. 
Also, perhaps the previously victimized minority is more concerned about distributive justice 
principles – they want the government to restore some of the harm caused by the injustice. On 
the other hand, distributive justice concerns are not salient for the majority because, for the 
most part, they are the benefactors of unjust distributions.  
There are a number of reasons why the combination of an apology and compensation 
were not particularly effective for the aggrieved minority in Study 1. One possible reason is 
the minimalist nature of the apology (see Appendix A). This apology contained few of the 
elements that signal a sincere political apology (Blatz et al., 2008). Many argue that an 
apology has to contain a number of elements that indicate genuineness in order to be effective 
(Blatz et al., 2008; Lazare, 2004; Tavuchis, 1991; Starzyk et al., in press). Although this 
apology was accompanied by compensation, a clear signal of sincerity, perhaps a more 
elaborate apology is necessary for the previously victimized minority. Furthermore, this 
apology was fabricated, so participants could only hear about it in the lab. Janna Thompson 
(2008) argues that an apology has to stand out from the daily news cycle so that it marks a 
turning point in history. The government needs to stage a grand and well-publicized ceremony 
that acknowledges how the current government recognizes and condemns this injustice, and 
values the minority group. The ceremony also indicates that the government is not just 
apologizing to settle a troubling political issue, but is earnestly regretful. In studies 3 and 4, I 
tested the effects of a real apology the Canadian government offered for the Chinese Head 
Tax. This apology made the news, was elaborate, and was accompanied by a large ceremony 




During the 2005-2006 election campaign, Stephen Harper promised, if elected, to offer 
an official apology and financial compensation for the Head Tax. Harper fulfilled this election 
pledge on June 22, 2006. Harper‘s election promise provided a unique opportunity to test the 
effect of an apology and compensation package. I surveyed a sample of Chinese and non-
Chinese Canadians in late May 2006. When I conducted this initial survey, it was unclear 
whether Harper would honor his election promise or what he would offer as compensation; 
thus, I could not assess evaluation of the offer in the initial survey. I sent a second 
questionnaire to a sample of the initial respondents a month after the government offered an 
official apology on behalf of all Canadians to the Chinese Canadian community. Also, the 
offer included individual compensation in the form of financial compensation of $20,000 to 
Head Tax payers or their surviving spouses, and group reparations in the form of a memorial 
education fund.  
At both times, respondents completed measures of identity with Canadians, and 
evaluated European Canadians and Chinese Canadians. Chinese Canadian participants also 
completed a measure of Chinese Canadian identity. In Study 2, the apology and compensation 
seemed to reduce majority group members‘ beliefs that the Head Tax reflects poorly on the 
federal government. In this study, I tested whether this result would generalize to other 
constructs, such as greater endorsement of the system (Kay & Jost, 2003), and decreased 
victim blame or derogation (Haynes & Olson, 2006). Participants completed measures of 
system endorsement (Kay & Jost, 2003), the degree to which the Head Tax reflects poorly on 
the system of government, and sympathy with the victims – those who paid the Head Tax. In 
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past research, respondents often respond to injustice by blaming, derogating, or withholding 
sympathy from the victims of that injustice (Haynes & Olson, 2006; Hafer & Begue, 2003). 
The sympathy measure tested if an apology and compensation would reduce the tendency to 
withhold compassion from the victims.  
In addition to completing the above measures, participants also evaluated the apology 
and the compensation at Time 2. In studies 1 and 2, I assessed support for apology and 
compensation. I switched to evaluation of the apology and compensation in this study because 
evaluation measures may be a more appropriate test of reactive devaluation (L. Ross & Ward, 
1995). Even though members of previously victimized groups may believe that the 
government should have offered an apology and compensation, they may find redress less 
satisfactory than the majority group. It is possible to think that a government should have done 
something, and still not be particularly satisfied with what they did. Finally, I did not collect a 
measure of forgiveness in this study because five studies – Study 1 and the four studies 
reported by Philpot and Hornsey (in press) – have failed to find an effect of redress on 
forgiveness. Since questionnaire length was an issue in this study, I dropped the forgiveness 
measure.  
Recall that an offer of both apology and compensation had no effect for previously 
victimized minority members in Study 1. Nevertheless, I still examined whether Chinese 
Canadians will show effects on the above measures in Study 3. It is possible that this apology 
would be more effective because it contained more indicants of sincerity (Blatz et al., 2008) 
than the apology in Study 1 did. Thus, I tested these five hypotheses: 
Hypothesis 1: Non-Chinese Canadians will evaluate the apology and compensation 
more positively than Chinese Canadians at Time 2. This prediction was based on balance 
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theory. The apology is offered on the majority group‘s behalf. Since non-Chinese Canadians 
likely have a more positive evaluation of the majority group than Chinese Canadians do 
(Tajfel & Turner, 1986), they should evaluate redress offered on behalf of that group more 
positively than Chinese Canadians.  
Hypothesis 2:  Both Chinese and non-Chinese Canadians will evaluate European 
Canadians more favorably at Time 2 compared to Time 1. This increase will replicate the 
results amongst the majority group in Study 2. It will occur amongst the majority group 
because non-Chinese Canadians, who are predominantly European, will feel better about a 
social identity they hold. In Study 1, I found no effect on this measure, but I wanted to 
evaluate if an apology that contained more sincerity elements would affect evaluation of the 
majority group for the previously victimized minority.  
Hypothesis 3:  Both Chinese and non-Chinese Canadians will evaluate Chinese 
Canadians more favorably at Time 2 compared to Time 1. This increase in evaluations will 
occur because Chinese Canadians feel more positive about their social identity, and because 
non-Chinese Canadians will derogate Chinese Canadians less. I did not find this result in 
either Study 1 or Study 2, but thought I might in this study because of the more expansive 
apology.  
Hypothesis 4: (4a) Both Chinese and non-Chinese Canadians will feel more identified 
with Canadians at Time 2 compared to Time 1 because the apology and compensation affirms 
their Canadian social identity. (4b) Chinese Canadians will feel more identified with Chinese 
Canadians at Time 2 compared to Time 1 because the apology and compensation affirms their 
Chinese Canadian social identity. Again, I did not find either result in Study 1 or Study 2, but 
thought that I may in this study because of the more elaborate apology.  
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Hypothesis 5: Both Chinese and non-Chinese Canadians will have greater faith in the 
fairness and justice of the present system at Time 2 compared to Time 1. This will lead them 
to: (5a) endorse the system more, (5b) believe that the Head Tax reflects less poorly on the 
system of government, and (5c) express more sympathy for the direct victims of the injustice. 
In Study 1, I did not find any support of this hypothesis amongst Chinese Canadians, but 
thought that I may in this study because of the different apology. If these hypotheses were 
supported amongst non-Chinese Canadians, Study 3 would replicate and expand on the results 
of Study 2.  
Method 
Participants 
Time 1.  Three hundred and twenty three Canadian university students completed the 
initial questionnaire in May of 2006. Participants were recruited from booths set up around the 
University of Waterloo campus (n = 201) and psychology participant pools (n = 122). When 
asked ―which specific ethnic group do you most identify with?‖ ninety-seven participants 
indicated that they were of Chinese heritage.  
Time 2.  The Canadian government apologized and offered reparations for the Head 
Tax on June 22, 2006 (―Compensation Offered,‖ 2006). Four weeks after the government 
offered redress, I sent an online questionnaire to all 97 Chinese and a random selection of 97 
non-Chinese Canadian participants. Fifty-nine non-Chinese and 58 Chinese Canadian 
participants completed the survey (60% overall completion rate). Twenty-one participants in 
the Chinese Canadian sample were female, and the average age of this sample was 20.74 
years. Twenty-three participants in the non-Chinese Canadian sample were female, and the 
average age of this sample was 21.76 years. When asked ―what is your ethnicity?‖ 49 of the 
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59 people in the non-Chinese Canadian sample chose White/Caucasian, 6 chose Asian (but 
not Chinese), 2 chose East Indian, and 2 chose other.  
Procedure   
In both surveys, participants read a brief description of the Head Tax. The passage 
described how the Canadian government recruited Chinese men to Canada to help build the 
railroad in the late 1800s. Once the railroad was complete, the government decided to limit 
Chinese immigration by imposing a Head Tax equivalent to two years wages on Chinese, and 
only Chinese, immigrants. Participants read that, at the same time, the government spent 
millions of dollars recruiting immigrants of European descent. The Head Tax effectively 
separated families for years as men living in Canada could not afford to pay for their families 
to join them. Participants also read about the Chinese Exclusion Act which barred Chinese 
immigration to Canada altogether from 1923 to 1947. All information in the passage was 
historically accurate.  
 Time 1 Dependent Variables 
After reading the passage at Time 1, participants completed a questionnaire assessing 
their reactions to it. I assessed participants‘ evaluations of Canadians of European and Chinese 
heritage on separate one-item scales (e.g., ―How positively or negatively do you feel towards 
Canadians of Chinese heritage?‖). Endpoints of the scale were labeled 1 (very positive) and 7 
(very negative). All participants also completed a four-item identification with Canada scale 
(e.g., ―I am pleased to be Canadian‖; Time 1 α = .82, Time 2 α = .88) adapted from Obst and 
White (2005). Chinese Canadian participants completed the same measure assessing 
identification with Chinese Canadians (e.g., ―I am pleased to be Chinese Canadian‖; Time 1 α 
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= .70, Time 2 α = .59). I changed these scales from Study 1 and Study 2 because these items 
are shorter, and I wanted to keep this questionnaire as short as possible. 
Three measures assessed justice or system threat. Participants indicated how much 
they endorsed the present system on an eight-item scale (e.g., ―In Canada, most policies serve 
the greater good‖; Kay & Jost, 2003; Time 1 α = .80, Time 2 α = .83). Participants also 
indicated their agreement with the statement that ―the treatment of Chinese immigrants 
reflects poorly on the current Canadian system of government‖ on seven-point disagree-agree 
scales. Finally, participants indicated sympathy for the immigrants who paid the tax by 
indicating agreement with two statements (e.g. ―I feel a lot of pity for the Chinese 
immigrants‖) that were combined in an index (Time 1 α = .66, and Time 2 α = .73).  
Time 2 Dependent Variables 
 As well as including the same items as in the initial questionnaire, the questionnaire at 
Time 2 included several additions. I began the survey by assessing whether participants had 
knowledge of the Head Tax apology. I asked participants ―Have you heard anything about the 
Government of Canada taking some kind of action on the Head Tax and related policies in the 
last month or two?‖ If they answered yes, they were also asked to describe what they heard. 
Twenty-four Chinese (40%) and 24 non-Chinese (41%) Canadian participants indicated that 
they had heard that the government had taken some kind of action in recent months. When I 
included whether participants had heard of the event as a factor in the analyses reported 
below, the significance level of all results were the same. There were also no main effects for 
hearing of the redress. (For a further discussion of the memory results see Appendix C). 
Participants then read the entire text of the Canadian government‘s apology and a description 
of the compensation package (Appendix B).  
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Participants evaluated the apology, and indicated their agreement with several 
statements about why the government apologized and offered compensation. Agreement with 
five statements created an index of their evaluation of the apology (―I am satisfied with 
Harper‘s apology‖; ―Harper was right to apologize‖; ―Harper offered a sincere apology‖; 
―Harper‘s apology is complete‖; and ―I find Harper‘s apology unacceptable‖ (reverse coded); 
α = .83). Participants‘ views regarding the effectiveness of the redress offer were assessed by 
indicating their agreement with five statements (―With the apology and financial 
compensation, justice has finally been done,‖ ―Harper‘s apology satisfactorily explained why 
the head tax occurred,‖ and ―Most non Chinese Canadians are deeply sorry for the Head Tax,‖ 
―Because of the apology, similar unjust government practices will never happen again,‖ 
―Because of the cash payments, similar unjust government practices will never happen again‖) 
on 1 (strongly disagree) to 7 (strongly agree) scales (α = .63). I also measured cynicism about 
the government‘s intentions by assessing agreement with the item ―Harper apologized mainly 
because he wants to win Chinese Canadian votes in the next election.‖ Finally, participants 
indicated if they thought it was right for the government to offer cash payments to the Head 
Tax payers, or their widows, and if they thought ―[i]t is unfair that children do not receive 
compensation if their father paid the Head Tax and both their father and mother have died.‖ 
Results 
Data analyses only included participants who completed both surveys. Answers to 
questions repeated in both surveys were analyzed in a 2 (Ethnicity: Chinese or non-Chinese 
Canadian) x 2 (Time of survey: before or after redress) ANOVA. Answers to the questions 
appearing only at Time 2 were tested for ethnicity differences.  
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Time 2 Only Measures 
Means and standard deviations for all measures collected only at Time 2 are presented 
in Table 3. At Time 2, participants evaluated the apology, indicated what they thought of the 
reparations, and inferred the government‘s motives for apologizing. Overall, Hypothesis 1 was 
supported. Non-Chinese Canadian participants evaluated the apology more favorably than 
Chinese Canadian participants did, t(115) = 2.24, p = .03, partial η
2 
= .04. Non-Chinese 
Canadian respondents were also more likely to think that the redress was effective t(115) = 
2.27, p = .03, partial η
2 
= .04. On the other hand, Chinese Canadian participants expressed 
more cynicism regarding the Canadian government‘s motives: they were more likely than 
non-Chinese Canadians to agree that the Prime Minister apologized to win Chinese Canadian 
votes in the next election, t(115) = 2.57, p = .01, partial η
2 
= .05. Finally, the responses of both 
groups were above the midpoint on the items asking if the government was right to offer 
reparations to Head Tax payers, or their widows, indicating that they endorsed the 
compensation. The two groups did not differ on these measures, (ts < 1). Compared to non-
Chinese Canadian participants, Chinese Canadian participants reported that the government 
was wrong not to compensate descendants if the payer and their spouse were deceased, t(115) 
= 3.35, p < .01, partial η
2  
= .09.  
Measures Collected at Both Times 
Means and standard deviations for measures collected at both times are presented in 
Table 4. Relative to Chinese Canadian participants, non-Chinese Canadian participants 
evaluated European Canadians more favorably (M = 5.11, SD = 1.13, and M = 4.60, SD = 
1.15), F(1, 114) = 7.89, p = .01, partial η
2 
=.07. In support of Hypothesis 2, both groups 
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evaluated European Canadians marginally more favorably at Time 2 (M = 4.96, SD = 1.19) 
than at Time 1 (M = 4.75, SD = 1.13), F(1, 114) = 3.35, p = .07, partial η
2 
=.03.  
It may make sense to only include self-identified European Canadian participants in the 
non-Chinese Canadian sample for this analysis. When I did, relative to Chinese Canadian 
participants, White Canadian participants evaluated European Canadians more favorably (M = 
5.15, SD = 1.15, and M = 4.60, SD = 1.15), F(1, 105) = 8.82, p < .01, partial η
2 
=.08. Both 
groups evaluated European Canadians more favorably at Time 2 (M = 4.95, SD = 1.20) than at 
Time 1 (M = 4.76, SD = 1.14), but this analysis did not approach significance, F(1, 105) = 
2.47, p = .12, partial η
2 
=.02. The effect size was virtually identical in this analysis as in the 
analysis that included all respondents. Thus, the difference was likely not significant in this 
analysis because of the reduced statistical power.  
Chinese or non-Chinese Canadian participants‘ evaluations of Chinese Canadians, or 
identification with Canadians, did not change across surveys, Fs < 1. Neither did Chinese 
Canadians‘ identification with Chinese Canadians, F < 1. Thus, hypotheses 3 and 4 were not 
supported. 
Recall that I collected three measures to assess whether apologies and compensation 
diminishes perceived threat to justice beliefs: a system endorsement scale, degree to which the 
Head Tax reflects poorly on the government, and sympathy with the Head Tax payers. 
Chinese Canadian participants endorsed the system less (M = 4.27, SD = 0.82) than non-
Chinese participants Canadian did (M = 4.82, SD = 0.89), F(1, 112) = 16.26, p < .001, partial 
η
2 
= .13, but endorsement was about the same both before and after the apology, F(1, 112) = 
1.10, p = .30, partial η
2 
= .01. Chinese Canadian participants were marginally more likely than 
non-Chinese Canadians to agree that the Head Tax reflected poorly on the current Canadian 
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system of government (M = 3.93, SD = 1.75, and M = 3.45, SD = 2.00), F(1, 111) = 2.96, p = 
.09, partial η
2 
= .03. Both groups agreed that the Head Tax reflected less poorly on the current 
system of government after redress (M = 3.36, SD = 1.81) than before (M = 4.01, SD = 1.98), 
F(1, 111) = 8.72, p < .01, partial η
2 
= .07. Finally, Chinese Canadian respondents reported 
more sympathy for the victims of the Head Tax than did non-Chinese Canadian respondents 
(M = 5.90, SD = 0.98, and M = 5.57, SD = 1.04), F(1, 115) = 4.21, p = .04, partial η
2
 = .04. 
Unexpectedly, sympathy was lower after redress (M = 5.57, SD = 1.12) than before (M = 5.90, 
SD = 0.93), F(1, 115) = 11.86, p < .01, partial η
2 
= .09, across both groups.  
Analysis of Attrition 
 The considerable attrition rate (40%) is a threat to the validity of the findings in this 
study for two reasons. First, the results of those who completed the Time 2 survey may not 
generalize to those who chose not to complete it. More importantly, I may have lost Chinese 
and non-Chinese Canadians for different reasons, and any differences in the type of people 
who respond to the questionnaire could account for the ethnicity differences. To examine 
whether the participants who completed the Time 2 questionnaire differed from those who did 
not, I ran 2 (ethnicity) x 2 (attrition: completed Time 2 or did not complete Time 2) ANOVAs 
on every variable collected at Time 1.  
 Analyses revealed that there was neither a main effect of participating at Time 2, nor 
an interaction involving participating at Time 2 and ethnicity on any measure (all Fs < 2.7, all 
ps < .10), except identity with Canadians. This analysis revealed main effects of ethnicity, 
F(1, 194) = 22.11, p < .01, partial η
2
 = .10, and of participation at Time 2, F(1, 194) = 3.82, p 
= .05, partial η
2
 = .02, which were qualified by a participation at Time 2 by ethnicity 
interaction, F(1, 194) = 4.39, p = .04, partial η
2
 = .02. Chinese Canadian respondents who 
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completed (M = 5.25, SD = 1.29) or did not complete (M = 5.23, SD = 1.02) the Time 2 
survey identified just as highly with Canadians, F < 1, but non-Chinese Canadian respondents 
who completed the Time 2 survey were more identified with Canadians (M = 6.28, SD = 0.96) 
than those who did not complete it (M = 5.65, SD = 1.08), F(1, 194) = 8.45, p < .01, partial η
2
 
= .09. Thus, it is possible that the differences between Chinese and non-Chinese Canadians on 
the evaluation of apology, perceived effectiveness of the redress, unfairness of not 
compensating descendants of payers, or any other measure reflects the differential attrition of 
low identified and high identified non-Chinese Canadians. I will examine this issue in the 
discussion section as well as in Study 4.  
Discussion 
It was better to give than receive an apology and compensation package. Compared to 
the historically victimized minority, the majority group, on whose behalf the apology was 
offered, evaluated the apology more favorably, thought the apology was more effective, was 
less cynical about the government‘s motives for apologizing, and less likely to note 
inadequacies in the compensation package. It is important to note, however, that both groups 
supported the apology and compensation; the majority was just more in favor than the 
victimized minority. Contrary to the concerns of some scholars and politicians (Brooks, 1999), 
just as in Study 2, there was no evidence of a backlash against the apology or the victimized 
group amongst the majority group.  
The apology and compensation marginally increased both Chinese and non-Chinese 
Canadian participants‘ evaluations of European Canadians, suggesting that they serve to 
affirm the identities of the majority and promoted positive intergroup feelings amongst the 
previously victimized minority. The increased evaluation of European Canadians replicated 
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the effect for the majority group from Study 2. The apology and compensation seemed to have 
no impact, however, on participants‘ evaluations of Chinese Canadians as a group. Both Study 
1 and Study 2 found null effects on this measure as well.  
Contrary to the speculations of many scholars (e.g., Gibney et al., 2008), identification 
with Canadians or Chinese Canadians was not affected by the apology and compensation. 
This replicates the null findings from Study 1 and Study 2. Even though this redress offer was 
extensive and surrounded by an elaborate ceremony, it still did not increase identification with 
Canadians or Chinese Canadians, and did not increase evaluations of Chinese Canadians.  
I also included measures to assess whether apologies and compensation (1) increase 
system endorsement, (2) diminish belief that the past misdeeds reflect poorly on the system of 
government, and (3) increase victim sympathy. Results were mixed. The apology and 
compensation had no effect on how much participants endorsed their system. The apology and 
compensation diminished belief that the Head Tax reflects poorly on the current system of 
government for both the majority and previously victimized minority groups, just as it did for 
majority group members in Study 2. Surprisingly, instead of increasing sympathy with the 
victims, the apology and compensation were followed by a decline in sympathy. Overall, out 
of the three measures designed to test Hypothesis 5, one showed a null result, one supported 
the hypothesis, and one had the opposite to the predicted effect. In the face of this conflicting 
evidence, more testing of this hypothesis is required.  
This study is, to the best of my knowledge, the first social psychological attempt to 
assess the impact of a real apology for a real historical event on intergroup feelings, social 
identities, and perceived endorsement of the social system. There are, however, three 
important limitations to the method employed in Study 3. Two of these limitations arise 
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because it was a quasi-experiment. First, there was considerable attrition in the sample; only 
60 percent of eligible participants completed Time 2. This attrition was selective: the non-
Chinese Canadians who completed the Time 2 survey were more highly identified with 
Canadians than those who did not complete it. Any ethnicity effects could have arisen because 
the sample of non-Chinese Canadians was biased. Second, I cannot rule out a variety of 
explanations for some of the observed effects. For example, the Head Tax received a great 
deal of media attention because of the apology. It is possible, however unlikely, that people 
evaluated European Canadians more positively at Time 2 because they learned more about 
European Canadians‘ role in the Head Tax. In Studies 1 and 2, I experimentally manipulated 
apology and compensation, and found some similar effects, which suggests that attrition and 
increased media exposure of the Head Tax are not probable accounts of the results of Study 3. 
Random assignment to condition should have eliminated the influence of attrition and 
increased media exposure of the Head Tax had on the results. Nevertheless, in Study 4, I 
randomly assigned participants to be exposed or not to the apology and compensation package 
the government actually offered. 
The third limitation arose because I did not assess people‘s evaluation of the apology 
and compensation package at Time 1. This limitation was inevitable – there was no way to 
know what the government would offer at Time 1. Because I did not collect evaluations of the 
redress at Time 1, I cannot know if the majority group‘s evaluation of the apology increased 
between Time 1 and Time 2. It is possible that non-Chinese Canadians evaluate an apology 
and compensation more favorably than Chinese Canadians regardless of whether or not they 
are offered. The most appropriate test of this hypothesis is to have participants evaluate an 
apology prospectively – how they think they would feel if an apology were offered – and 
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retrospectively – how they actually feel when an apology is offered. In Study 4, I randomly 




One year after the Canadian government apologized and offered reparations for the 
Chinese Head Tax, I surveyed a sample Chinese and non-Chinese Canadians students from a 
psychology participant pool at a Canadian university. I randomly assigned students to read or 
not read the apology and compensation offered by the Canadian government (―Compensation 
Offered,‖ 2006). I recruited participants who had and had not heard of the apology and 
compensation, but only included participants who had no knowledge of the redress package in 
the statistical analyses.  
The manipulation was simple. Participants either read or did not read the apology and 
compensation package the Canadian government actually offered. I collected many of the 
same measures as in Study 3. Respondents completed measures of identity with Canadians, 
and evaluated European Canadians and Chinese Canadians. Chinese Canadian participants 
also completed a measure of identification with Chinese Canadians. All participants 
completed measures of perceived extent to which the Head Tax reflects poorly on the system 
of government and sympathy with the victims. Since it showed no effects of time in Study 1, I 
dropped the system endorsement scale from this study.  
Participants also evaluated the apology. I only included apology evaluation items from 
Study 3 that could reasonably be asked prospectively and retrospectively. In the prospective 
condition, participants indicated how they would feel on the apology evaluation items if an 
apology were offered. Participants in the retrospective condition indicated how they felt about 
the actual apology, which they read.  
Altogether, collecting these measures allowed me to test the following hypotheses: 
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Hypothesis 1: Based on reactive devaluation, I predicted that (1a) before an apology is 
offered, non-Chinese Canadians will prospectively evaluate it less positively than Chinese 
Canadians; however, (1b) after an apology is offered, non-Chinese Canadians will 
retrospectively evaluate it more positively than Chinese Canadians. This effect will be driven 
by the fact that (1c) the evaluations of the majority group will be more favorable in the 
retrospective compared to the prospective condition, whereas (1d) the historically mistreated 
minority will reactively devalue the apology and compensation. This study was the best test of 
these predictions in this thesis. It is the only study that asked both majority and previously 
victimized minority group members to evaluate redress both before and after it was offered.  
Hypothesis 2: Both Chinese and non-Canadians will evaluate European Canadians 
more positively in the retrospective condition – when they read the apology and compensation 
package – compared to the prospective condition – in which they did not read the apology and 
compensation package. This will replicate Studies 2 and 3.  
In neither Study 1, 2, nor 3 did I find an effect of offering both an apology and 
compensation for evaluations of Chinese Canadians, identification with Canadians, or 
identification with Chinese Canadians. Therefore, I did not predict that these measures would 
be affected by condition in this study.   
Finally, I found mixed results for the justice-related measures in Study 3. The apology 
and compensation appeared to diminish concerns that the Head Tax reflects poorly on the 
government, as predicted, and as it did for majority group members in Study 2. Contrary to 
predictions, the apology and compensation decreased the extent to which participants 
sympathized with the victims. In this study, I wanted to see if these expected and unexpected 
results would replicate. Thus, I hypothesized that: 
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Hypothesis 3: Both Chinese and non-Chinese Canadians will evidence greater belief in 
the fairness of the present system by believing that the Head Tax reflects less poorly on the 
system of government in the retrospective compared to the prospective condition. I was less 
clear what would happen for victim sympathy. Justice motivation theories predict that an 
apology and compensation would lead participants to express more sympathy for the direct 
victims in the retrospective than the prospective condition. In Study 3, however, participants‘ 
expressed less sympathy for the direct victims after an apology and compensation. Thus, I did 
not make a strong prediction on this measure. There are reasons that it could go either way. 
Method 
Participants  
One hundred and seventy-two participants (97 women, 66 men, 9 unspecified) 
completed the survey. When asked to report ethnicity, one hundred participants indicated that 
they were of Chinese heritage. I recruited more Chinese Canadian than non-Chinese Canadian 
participants because I excluded participants from analyses if they had heard of the apology, 
and Chinese participants were more likely to have heard (see below). When the non-Chinese 
sample responded to the same question, 26 chose White/Caucasian, 13 chose East Indian, 7 
chose other Asian, 4 chose Black/African, 15 chose other, and 7 left the question blank. I 
excluded those who left the question blank.  
Procedure and Materials  
Participants signed on to the study website at their own leisure. After consenting to 
participate, they read a description of the Head Tax, which was identical to Study 3. I then 
asked participants ―Have you heard anything about the Government of Canada taking some 
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kind of action on the Head Tax and related policies in the last year?‖ Forty-six percent of 
Chinese Canadian and 15% of non-Chinese Canadian participants had heard. When I analyzed 
all the variables in the study in a 2 (ethnicity: Chinese or non-Chinese Canadian) x 2 (heard of 
event: yes or no) ANOVA there were no main effects or interactions involving hearing of the 
event on any measure. Nevertheless, I only included participants in the analyses if they had 
not heard of the apology or compensation. Significance levels of all reported results were the 
same including or not including these participants. (For a further discussion of the memory 
results see Appendix C).  
 Participants were then randomly assigned to either the prospective or retrospective 
conditions. Participants in the prospective condition did not read the apology or compensation 
package, but went on to indicate how they would feel about an apology if the redress package 
were offered. In the retrospective condition, I presented the full text of the apology and a brief 
description of the compensation package. These passages were identical to Study 3 (see 
Appendix B). Participants in the retrospective condition indicated how they actually felt about 
the apology. This measure contained four items. In the prospective condition, in which 
participants did not read the government redress offer, the items were: ―If the government 
apologizes it will be mainly because they want to eliminate bad press‖ (reverse coded), ―I 
would be satisfied if the government apologized,‖ ―The government would be right to 
apologize for the Head Tax and related policies,‖ and ―With the apology, justice will finally 
be done.‖ In the retrospective condition, in which participants read the government redress 
offer, the statements were made in the past tense: ―The government apologized mainly 
because they wanted to eliminate bad press‖ (reverse coded), ―I am satisfied with the 
government‘s apology,‖ ―The government was right to apologize for the Head Tax and related 
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policies,‖ and ―With the apology, justice will finally be done.‖ The scale was moderately 
reliable (α = .60).  
 After evaluating the apology, participants completed the remaining measures. I 
assessed participants‘ evaluations of Canadians of European and Chinese heritage on 100-
point thermometer evaluation measures with endpoints of the scale labeled 0 (extremely 
unfavorable) and 100 (extremely favorable). The identity with Canadians and Chinese 
Canadians measures were the full 12-item Obst and White (2005) measures (e.g., ―I am 
pleased to be Canadian‖; α = .90; and ―I am pleased to be Chinese Canadian‖; α = .89). The 
measures of perceived reflection of the Head Tax on the current system and victim sympathy 
were identical to Study 3.  
Results 
 Answers to all continuous measures in this study were analyzed using 2 (ethnicity: 
Chinese or non-Chinese Canadian) x 2 (apology: prospective or retrospective) ANOVAs. 
When the analysis yielded a significant interaction, simple effects were tested using the 
pooled error and degrees of freedom. Means and standard deviations for all measures are 
displayed in Table 5. 
Evaluation of Apology.  Again, evaluation of the apology was above the midpoint (M = 
4.17, SD = 0.96), indicating that participants were positively disposed towards the apology. 
Hypotheses 1a, 1b, and 1c were all supported. The 2 (ethnicity) X 2 (apology) ANOVA 
revealed a main effect of condition, F(1, 103) = 5.84, p = .02, partial η
2 
= .05, such that people 
evaluated the apology more favorably in the retrospective condition (M = 4.36, SD = 1.08) 
than in the prospective condition (M = 3.91, SD = 0.74). However this effect was qualified by 
a significant interaction, F(1, 103) = 8.08, p = .01, partial η
2 
= .07. Non-Chinese Canadian 
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participants evaluated the apology more favorably in the retrospective than in the prospective 
condition, F(1, 103) = 14.14, p < .001 , partial η
2 
= .21, but Chinese Canadian participants 
evaluated the apology equally in both conditions, F(1, 103) < 1. Framed differently, in the 
prospective condition, non-Chinese Canadian participants evaluated the apology non-
significantly less favorably than Chinese Canadian participants, F(1, 103) = 2.36, p = .12, 
partial η
2 
= .08. Replicating Study 3, in the retrospective condition, non-Chinese participants 
evaluated the apology significantly more favorably than Chinese Canadian participants, F(1, 
103) = 6.59, p = .01, partial η
2 
= .08.  
 Evaluation of European Canadians.  Overall, participants evaluated European 
Canadians favorably (M = 67.01, SD = 14.92). Non-Chinese Canadian participants evaluated 
European Canadians marginally more favorably (M = 70.11, SD = 15.18) than Chinese 
Canadian participants did (M = 64.31, SD = 14.91), F(1, 101) = 3.43, p = .07, partial η
2 
= .03. 
No other effects approached significance (Fs < 2.7, ps > .10). Including only those non-
Chinese Canadians who did not identify as White/Caucasian in the non-Chinese sample did 
not alter the statistical significance of this effect (Fs < 1, ps > .74). 
 Evaluation of Chinese Canadians.  Overall, participants evaluated Chinese Canadians 
favorably (M = 67.69, SD = 18.40). Chinese Canadian participants evaluated Chinese 
Canadians more favorably (M = 73.59, SD = 15.38) than non-Chinese Canadian participants 
did (M = 61.75, SD = 19.56), F(1, 98) = 11.68, p < .01, partial η
2 
= .11. Neither the main 
effect of condition, nor the interaction was significant (Fs < 1, ps > .66).  
 Identity with Canadians. Overall, participants were identified with being Canadian (M 
= 4.84, SD = 1.01). Main effects of group, F(1, 102) = 12.03, p < .01, partial η
2 
= .11, and 
apology and compensation condition, F(1, 102) = 4.97, p =.03, partial η
2 
= .05, were qualified 
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by a significant interaction, F(1, 102) = 5.76, p = .02, partial η
2 
= .05. Chinese Canadians 
identified less with Canadians in the retrospective than prospective condition, F(1, 102) = 
10.40, p < .01, partial η
2 
= .17, whereas non-Chinese Canadians identity with Canadians was 
unaffected by condition, F(1, 107) < 1. I will examine this unexpected finding in the 
discussion section.   
Identity with Chinese Canadians.  Overall, Chinese Canadian participants were 
identified with being Chinese Canadian (M = 5.33, SD = 0.97). The level of identification was 
not affected by apology condition, F < 1.  
 Reflects Poorly on Government.  Overall, participants were around the midpoint on 
this measure (M = 3.89, SD = 1.77), suggesting that they were indifferent. There were no main 
effects or interactions (all Fs < 1.7, all ps > .20).  
 Sympathy for Head Tax Payers.  Overall, participants felt sympathetic towards the 
victims of the Head Tax (M = 5.78, SD = 1.23). Chinese Canadian participants expressed 
more sympathy for the Head Tax payers (M = 5.99, SD = 0.99) than non-Chinese Canadian 
participants did (M = 5.56, SD = 1.40), F(1, 102) = 3.88, p = .05, partial η
2 
= .04. There was 
neither a condition effect nor a condition by ethnicity interaction (Fs < 1.4, all ps > .22).  
Discussion 
 When asked to imagine how they would feel if an apology were offered for the 
Chinese Head Tax, non-Chinese Canadians evaluated the apology less favorably than Chinese 
Canadians did. However, when participants evaluated an apology they just read, non-Chinese 
Canadians evaluated the apology more favorably than Chinese Canadians did. Across all 
studies, results reveal that the majority group does not evidence a backlash against an apology 
as some scholars and politicians fear (e.g., Brooks, 1999). Rather the majority became 
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enamoured with the apology when they thought that it was offered. The results of this study 
confirm the predictions of balance and system justification theories (Heider, 1958; Kay et al., 
2007). The majority, on whose behalf the apology is given, evaluate an apology that has not 
been offered less positively because they want to maintain psychological balance between 
their favorable evaluations of their group (Tajfel & Turner, 1986), and the fact that their group 
has not apologized. However, when an apology is given on the majority‘s behalf, they become 
more positive towards it, again, to maintain balance between their favorable evaluation of 
their group, and the fact that their group has apologized. System justification theory suggests 
that the majority becomes more enamoured with their government‘s offer because they want 
to justify the actions of their government.  
Recent historical events provide further anecdotal evidence of an increase in 
evaluations amongst the majority group. Since the beginning of 2007, six American states 
have apologized for their role in slavery (Virginia, Maryland, North Carolina, Alabama, New 
York, and New Jersey). Despite fears of a backlash (Brooks, 1999), there has been very little 
public opposition expressed towards these apologies. Similarly, on February 13, 2008, the 
Australian government apologized for years of abuse of Australian Aborigines (commonly 
referred to as the Stolen Generations; ―Australia Apology,‖ 2008). Approximately 10 days 
before, and four days after the apology, Galaxy Research surveyed a representative sample of 
1,100 Australians assessing their support for the apology. The poll did not distinguish between 
Aborigine and non-Aborigine respondents, but presumably the strong majority of respondents 
were non-Aborigine. Before the apology, just over half of respondents (55%) said that they 
supported the apology. However, just days after the apology more than two-thirds (68%) of 
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Australians indicated support (Metherell, 2008). To put it another way, 2.8 million more 
Australians supported the apology just days after it was offered compared to before.  
To date, there is absolutely no empirical evidence that an apology or compensation 
causes the majority to backlash against the government, the aggrieved minority, or the 
apology and compensation themselves (Brooks, 1999). The only evidence available suggests 
that the majority becomes more positive towards offers of apology and compensation once 
they are made.  
 In Study 4, the previously victimized minority was somewhat positive towards an 
apology before it was offered, and their evaluation remained as positive when it was offered. 
This result likely arose because, relative to the majority, the previously victimized minority is 
less motivated to justify the apology because it is not offered on their behalf.  
 Contrary to predictions, there was no evidence of reactive devaluation amongst the 
previously victimized minority (L. Ross & Ward, 1995). Reactive devaluation predicts that 
Chinese Canadian participants would evaluate the apology less favorably when they evaluated 
it retrospectively compared to when they evaluated it prospectively. In most previous reactive 
devaluation research, participants evaluate a proposal from an adversary, such as Israeli Jews 
appraising a peace proposal from a Palestinian leader (e.g., Maoz et al., 2002). However, 
neither the Canadian government nor European Canadians are currently strong adversaries of 
Chinese Canadians. For Chinese Canadians, the government is their government; it controls 
their outcomes (Kay et al., 2007) and some participants may have voted for this political 
party. Furthermore, Chinese Canadians scored above the midpoint on their evaluations of 
European Canadians. Because Chinese Canadian participants were evaluating an offer from a 
party who is not necessarily a strong adversary and whom they evaluate positively, they may 
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not reactively devalue that party‘s offer. Balance theory supports this explanation. Since 
Chinese Canadians did not feel negative towards the government or majority, they should not 
maintain psychological balance by devaluing an offer this government makes on behalf of the 
majority group. It should be noted that this non-adversarial explanation is pure speculation. 
There is no previous literature, that I could identify, which has examined whether reactive 
devaluation varies by the degree to which participants are strong adversaries.  
 Contrary to the results of Studies 2 and 3, majority and historically victimized minority 
group members felt as favorably towards European Canadians when they read about the 
apology than when they did not. Inspection of the means in Table 5 reveals that majority 
group members evaluated European Canadians more positively when they read the apology 
compared to when they did not, whereas Chinese Canadians did not show the same tendency. 
Furthermore, the previously victimized minority‘s evaluation of European Canadians was 
equal before and after the apology. This finding replicates the results of Studies 1 and 2, 
which showed that Chinese Canadians felt as positive towards White Canadians when an 
apology and compensation were offered compared to when they were not, but non-Chinese 
evaluations of White Canadians improved. 
 As in previous studies, offering apologies and compensation did not influence either 
the majority or aggrieved minority‘s feelings towards Chinese Canadians, or identity with 
Chinese Canadians. There were also no effects on feelings of sympathy for Head Tax payers 
(Hypothesis 5b). Study 3 found that an apology and compensation lowered sympathy for the 
victims. Given that this effect was unpredicted, and did not replicate, I am reluctant to draw 
strong conclusions from this result.  
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Also contrary to Studies 2 and 3, there were no effects of offering an apology and 
compensation on perceptions that the Head Tax reflected less poorly on the system of 
government for either group. It is not immediately clear why there was no effect on this 
measure. Both the apology and compensation offer and the measure were identical in this 
study and in Study 3. It may be that some time needs to pass after the apology for beliefs that 
the past reflects poorly on the government to diminish. However, in Study 2, majority group 
members completed a similar measure right after learning about the apology or compensation, 
and this belief was still reduced.  
Surprisingly, Chinese Canadians identified less with Canadians in the retrospective 
condition compared to the prospective condition. This finding was unexpected and it did not 
arise in either Study 1 or Study 3. The Chinese Canadian participants in this study may have 
noticed and cared more that cash payments were not offered to descendants of Head Tax 
payers, which may have led them to dis-identify with Canadians. Alternatively, perhaps 
Chinese Canadian participants in Studies 1 and 3 felt less identified with Canadians after the 
apology, but I did not detect the effect because I was using different and shorter identification 
scales. Each of these explanations seem plausible. However, given that this effect only arose 
in one of three studies in which it could have, I believe it is important to replicate the result 





In this thesis, I applied social psychological theory and methodology to ongoing 
discussions about apology and compensation for historical injustices. In three experiments and 
one quasi-experiment, I tested the proposal made by various scholars that apologies and 
compensation lead to forgiveness and reconciliation (e.g., Gibney et al., 2008). Based on 
social psychological theories, I also derived predictions of other psychological effects an offer 
of apology and compensation may have for the historically victimized minority, as well as for 
the majority group on whose behalf apologies and compensation are typically offered. 
Additionally, I examined the condition under which majority and historically victimized 
minorities will be satisfied with the apology and compensation offer.  
Satisfaction with the Apology and Compensation 
I examined the conditions under which historically victimized and majority group 
members evaluate an apology and compensation positively or negatively. The predictions of 
balance theory and system justification theory received reliable and consistent support. 
Despite evaluating the apology and compensation more negatively than the historically 
mistreated minority before they were offered, the majority consistently evaluated the apology 
and compensation more positively than the historically mistreated minority once they were 
offered. The results of polling data in Australia provided further evidence for this hypothesis 
using representative sampling (Metherell, 2008). This increased evaluation of the apology 
after it was offered amongst the majority group could have arisen because the majority 
justified the actions of their government (Kay et al., 2007), because the majority is attempting 
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to maintain psychological balance between their favorable evaluations of the government and 
the government‘s actions (Heider, 1958), or both.  
Despite the group differences, it is important to emphasize that both the previously 
victimized and majority group respondents were generally quite satisfied with the apology. 
Clearly, two studies with university student participants are not definitive, but the evaluation 
of redress results suggest that members of the previously victimized minority and, especially 
the nonvictimized majority, evaluate comprehensive government apologies and compensation 
offers for historical injustices more favorably after these offers have been offered compared to 
before. If additional research corroborates these findings, government leaders could perhaps 
be less concerned about a potential political backlash towards the apology by the majority 
group.  
In no study was their evidence of reactive devaluation (L. Ross & Ward, 1995), which 
predicts that previously victimized minority participants would evaluate an apology and 
compensation less favorably after it was offered relative to before. In Study 4, Chinese 
participants evaluated the apology as favorably when asked to evaluate an apology they had 
just read as when asked to imagine how they would feel if the apology were offered. Reactive 
devaluation likely received little support because the government and majority group were not 
strong adversaries of Chinese Canadians. In most previous reactive devaluation research, 
participants devalue an offer from an adversary (Maoz et al., 2002).  
Forgiveness 
In one study, I examined whether an offer of both apology and compensation would 
lead members of the historically victimized minority to feel more forgiving of the majority 
group compared to when no offer was made. Replicating Philpot and Hornsey (in press), there 
 
 66 
was no evidence that an offer of apology and compensation led to forgiveness. To date, five 
studies have tested whether apologies lead to forgiveness of the group that perpetrated a 
historical injustice. Not one has found evidence that they do.  
Reconciliation 
Even though an apology may not promote forgiveness, it may still lead to 
reconciliation (Hamber, 2007). In three studies, I examined if an offer of both apology and 
compensation would promote reconciliation in the form of positive evaluations of the majority 
group by the historically mistreated minority. In Study 3, Chinese Canadians evaluated 
European Canadians more positively after the government offered an apology and 
compensation for the Chinese Head Tax. However, this reconciliation result did not replicate 
in the other two studies that made the same comparison. I combined the data of all three 
studies that tested this hypothesis in a meta-analysis to examine whether the apology and 
compensation increased Chinese Canadian participants‘ evaluations of European Canadians. 
This analysis revealed that Chinese Canadians felt just as positively towards European 
Canadians whether or not the apology and compensation were offered, Z = 0.04, p = .96, 
Cohen‘s d = 0.03.  
Social Identity 
According to social identity theory, people are motivated to believe that the groups 
they belong to are just and respected by others (Tajfel & Turner, 1986). If one‘s group has 
been mistreated by the government in the past, it suggests that society neither respects nor 
accepts one‘s group (Blatz et al., 2008). If one‘s group has harmed others in the past, it 
suggests that one‘s group is unjust (Blatz et al., 2008; Branscombe & Doosje, 2004). 
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Historical injustices, therefore, threatens the social identities of both the historically 
victimized minority and the non-victimized majority. An apology and compensation can offset 
these threats to social identities amongst members of both groups. For example, governments 
often explicitly praise the historically mistreated minority and majority groups when they 
apologize (Blatz et al., 2008). Plus, compensation signals that the apology is sincere (Minow, 
2002).  
In all four studies, I tested whether offers of apology and compensation affirmed the 
social identities of both the aggrieved minority and majority groups. In terms of social 
identity, it was better to give than receive the redress package. Chinese Canadian participants‘ 
evaluations of Chinese Canadians were unaffected by the apology and compensation. On the 
other hand, non-Chinese Canadian participants felt more positive towards the majority group 
(White or European Canadians) after both an apology and compensation were offered in all 
three studies that made the comparison, but the difference was only statistically significant 
twice. I combined the data of all three comparisons in a meta-analysis to compare whether 
non-Chinese Canadian participants evaluated European Canadians more positively after both 
an apology and compensation were offered. This analysis revealed a significant increase in the 
favorability of non-Chinese Canadians‘ evaluation of European Canadians, Z = 2.68, p = .007, 
Cohen‘s d = 0.28. Thus, social identity theory suggested a psychological construct that could 
be affected by an apology and compensation. The redress offer only improved the majority 
group‘s evaluation of their social identity.  
Contrary to the writings of many scholars (Barkan, 2000; Minow, 2002; Gibney et al., 
2008) an apology and compensation did not lead majority or historical victimized minority 
members to feel more favorably disposed towards the victimized minority. It is not exactly 
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clear why an apology and compensation did not influence this variable. There are many 
explanations of a null result. It could be that knowledge of the Head Tax has no bearing on 
how positively people evaluate the previously victimized minority, so apologizing and 
offering compensation for that abuse will not change people‘s evaluations. It could also be 
that I measured these constructs poorly, so would observe effects if I used more reliable and 
valid measures. However, I used the same measures for evaluation of European Canadians, 
which showed significant results.  
Justice Motivations 
 Justice motivation theories, such as just world theory (Lerner, 1980), and system 
justification theory (Kay et al., 2007) suggest that people are motivated to believe that their 
political system is just and fair. Historical injustices threaten these beliefs because they 
provide evidence of extreme mistreatment by the system. In the current studies, I tested 
whether apologies and compensation would diminish concerns that the historical injustice 
reflects poorly on the present system of government. Also, when confronted with evidence 
that their system has acted unjustly, people often respond by blaming, derogating, or 
withholding sympathy from the victims of that injustice (Haynes & Olson, 2006). Therefore, I 
examined whether offering an apology and compensation would diminish the tendency for the 
majority group to derogate the victimized minority group and withhold sympathy from the 
direct victims of the injustice – the Head Tax payers.  
 Once again, it was better to give than receive the apology and compensation. In two 
studies, non-Chinese Canadians indicated that the Head Tax reflected less poorly on the 
Canadian system of government after the redress compared to before. However, Chinese 
Canadians only showed a similar effect in one study. Again, I combined the results across all 
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the studies to determine if Chinese and non-Chinese linked the present government to the 
historical injustice less after the apology and compensation, relative to before. Non-Chinese 
Canadians indicated that they thought the Head Tax reflect less poorly on the system of 
government after both an apology and compensation were offered, Z = 2.95, p = .003, 
Cohen‘s d = 0.30. Chinese Canadian participants, on the other hand, linked the government to 
the historical injustice as much before or after the apology and compensation, Z = 0.49, p = 
.62, Cohen‘s d = 0.06. The redress did not change any participants‘ evaluations of the 
victimized minority, or increase sympathizing with the direct victims – the Head Tax payers.  
 Justice motivation theories suggested a few psychological variables an apology and 
compensation could affect. Again, the redress affected members of the majority more than 
members of the historically mistreated minority.  
Offers of Apologies or Compensation Alone 
 Governments sometimes apologize without offering compensation, or offer 
compensation without apology. Study 1 confirmed the predictions of Minow (2002) and 
reactance theory (Brehm, 1966). An offer of apology or compensation alone did not lead to 
forgiveness, increase, reconciliation, nor satisfy social identity worries, or appease justice 
concerns for the historically mistreated minority. In fact, as Minow (2002) suggested, the 
historically mistreated minority felt less forgiving and less identified with Canadians when an 
apology or compensation were offered alone compared to when neither were offered. Study 2 
confirmed the prediction of reactance theory that majority group members would not evidence 
reactance against an apology or compensation offered alone because nothing was being 
withheld from them (Brehm, 1966). Thus, reactance theory provided novel explanations of 
when, and for whom, an apology or compensation would be ineffective if offered alone.  
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Addition to the Literature 
The results of the current studies expand on the results of Philpot & Hornsey (in press) 
in a number of ways. First of all, rather than describe a fictional apology, Studies 3 and 4 
assessed the effects of an apology after it was actually offered. Second, the present studies 
suggest that a simple sorry may not be enough. Philpot and Hornsey (in press) only 
manipulated whether or not an apology was offered. In the studies reported in this thesis, I 
examined offers of both apology and compensation. The most important difference between 
the studies reported in this thesis and those of Philpot and Hornsey (in press), however, was 
that the current studies included majority group members. I found that apologies and 
compensation had larger effects on the majority group on whose behalf the redress was 
offered than on members of the aggrieved minority who received the offer. Philpot and 
Hornsey (in press) only examined the responses of apology recipients.   
Limitations and Unanswered Questions 
Can cultural differences more readily account for the present results? 
 Chinese and non-Chinese Canadians differ not only in whether they belong to the 
group who was victimized by or who perpetrated the Head Tax, but in many other respects as 
well. One obvious difference is cultural background (Markus & Kitayama, 1991). Most 
Chinese Canadian participants grew up, at least in part, within a culture that advocates 
collectivist values, whereas most non-Chinese Canadian participants grew up, for the most 
part, within a culture that advocates individualistic values. These two cultural frameworks 
may place different meanings on apologies, which could account for the ethnicity differences 
in evaluation of the apology. The results of Study 4 cast doubt on this possibility. Compared 
to non-Chinese Canadians, Chinese Canadian participants valued the apology more before it 
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was offered, but less after it was offered.  It is, thus, questionable whether a cultural account 
explains the current results.  
 A more nuanced cultural account is still a possible explanation. For example, perhaps 
collectivistic cultures place greater emphasis on the need to apologize to rebuild relationships; 
therefore, Chinese Canadians may be more positively disposed towards the apology before it 
is offered relative to non-Chinese Canadians. However, apologies may be more common in 
collectivist cultures because they may be valued more. If that were the case, people raised 
within a collectivistic culture may consider an apology that is given to be less profound than 
would people raised within an individualistic culture. Therefore, Chinese Canadians may be 
less positively disposed towards the apology after it is offered than non-Chinese Canadians 
because apologies are more common in their lives. Future research should examine whether 
the results presented in this thesis generalize to situations in which cultural background is not 
confounded with status as either the historically victimized or majority group.  
Why does the majority group evaluate redress more positively than the aggrieved minority? 
 Recall from the introduction that there are at least two reasons the majority group may 
evaluate apologies and reparations more positively after they are offered compared to before. 
Majority group members may increase support in order to justify the system, or maintain 
psychological balance. This is likely a multiply determined effect; the increased evaluation of 
the apology observed amongst majority group members is likely determined by each of these 
processes. Which reason matters more depends on the circumstances: How motivated is the 
majority to justify the system? How much psychological imbalance is caused by offering the 
apology? Further research should determine the conditions under which each of these 
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explanations accounts for the majority group‘s more positive evaluation of apologies once 
they are offered. 
Can we generalize from university student populations to those who care more about the 
Head Tax? 
 The short answer is probably not, or, at least, one cannot tell. I was unable to recruit 
any direct victims of the Head Tax as fewer than 30 are alive today (―Compensation Offered,‖ 
2006). However, the apology (as well as the harm) was directed not just at the victims, but 
also at the Chinese Canadian community more generally. It is not clear how a sample of 
Chinese Canadians who are older, who perhaps have more knowledge of the Head Tax, and 
who may have been alive when the Head Tax was implemented would respond. Similarly, it is 
not clear how a more representative sample of the majority group would respond. One could 
imagine that a majority group sample who is older, possibly less politically liberal, and who 
may have been alive when the Head Tax was implemented would be less enamored with the 
apology. However, the polling results in Australia, which showed that a representative sample 
of Australians became more favorable towards an apology after it was offered compared to 
before (Metherell, 2008), suggests that one can generalize from the current studies to more 
representative majority group populations.  
 Perhaps more important than demographic differences between the samples collected 
in the studies I conducted and the populations I would like to generalize to, is the relative lack 
of prior commitment to redress. Less than half of both the Chinese Canadian and non-Chinese 
Canadian samples in the current studies had prior knowledge of the Head Tax or reparations 
debate. It is unclear how people who are more invested in reparations– for or against it – 
would respond. For example, majority group members who actively oppose apologies and 
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compensation might become upset with the government for offering them. On the other hand, 
victimized minority group members who actively lobby for apologies and compensation may 
be more satisfied with the government‘s offer than the Chinese Canadian participants I 
recruited were.  
Can we generalize from the Head Tax to recent or ongoing intergroup injustices? 
 The Head Tax was retracted more than 60 years ago, there is little ongoing conflict 
between Chinese and non-Chinese Canadians, and the intergroup feelings in the Head Tax 
situation are positive. Relative to the midpoint of the scale, Chinese Canadians felt positive 
towards European Canadians, and European Canadians felt positive towards Chinese 
Canadians. Because this injustice is half a century old, there is little ongoing conflict, and 
these groups felt relatively good about each other, both Chinese and non-Chinese Canadians 
are more likely to accept redress for the Head Tax. In the context of less positive intergroup 
feelings, or for ongoing conflicts, both sides may be less open to a redress offer.  
 Once again, the Australian polling data suggests that one may be able to generalize 
these findings to recent conflicts (Metherell, 2008). The abuse of Aborigine Australians ended 
relatively recently (Thompson, 2008). Yet, like the non-Chinese Canadians in the Head Tax 
studies, non-Aborigine Australians appear to evaluate the apology more favorably after it was 
offered compared to before. Nevertheless, there is no evidence suggesting whether the 
intergroup feelings of non-Aborigine and Aborigine Australians are more or less positive than 
the intergroup feelings of non-Chinese and Chinese Canadians. Also, it is not clear how 
Aborigine Australians responded to this apology.  
Is it possible to construct an apology that is valued more by the victimized group? 
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Majority group members may value an apology because they see it as turning the page 
on a dark point in history, but the victimized group may value it more as an important first 
step in correcting long-standing injustices (Bright-Fleming, 2008). Reparations lobbyists and 
scholars alike often argue that an apology is not the end of the process, but is the first step 
towards correcting harms and inequalities (Berry, 2008; Bright-Fleming, 2008; ―Plenty More 
to be Done,‖ 2008). Interpersonally, when we upset someone, we often need to make up for 
the harm to rebuild the relationship. However, before the victim will listen to our proposed 
solution, we need to recognize the harm we committed and express sorrow for it (Tavuchis, 
1991; Minow, 2002).  
The Head Tax apology and compensation may be valued less by Chinese Canadians 
than by non-Chinese Canadians because the apology and compensation is viewed as a first 
step. Thus, if the Head Tax redress package tried more thoroughly to meet the demands of 
Chinese Canadians – if it tried to be more than just a first step – it may be valued more by the 
aggrieved group. Some viewed the Head Tax apology and compensation as inadequate. They 
argued that the next step was to compensate the descendants. For example, New Democratic 
Party leader Jack Layton, who was a loud and vocal advocate for an apology and reparations, 
said ―the next step – to achieve full justice, reconciliation and closure – is surely…to provide 
redress to their children‖ (―NDP Welcomes Apology,‖ 2006). Also, the results of Study 3 
revealed that Chinese Canadian participants were more likely to agree that it was unfair not to 
offer compensation to descendants than non-Chinese Canadian participants were. Similarly, in 
Australia, some argued that the apology to Aborigine Australians was inadequate and more 
substantial offers needed to be made (Sullivan, 2008). This analysis suggests that the 
aggrieved group may value a redress package more if it is negotiated to more closely meet the 
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group‘s needs. Future research should examine the conditions under which an apology and 
compensation package will be valued more by, and be more beneficial for, aggrieved minority 
groups.  
Do apologies and compensation satisfy unique psychological motives? 
 Many scholars discuss the separate functions served by apologies and compensation 
(Bright-Fleming, 2008; de Grieff, 2008; Minow, 2002). For example de Grieff (2008) and 
Minow (2002) argue that apologies restore trust and faith in the social order, whereas 
compensation measures symbolically communicate that the government is sincerely sorry and 
recognize the victims as important members of society. It remains to be empirically 
demonstrated whether apologies and compensation serve these differing functions. Similarly, 
different victim groups demand different types of reparations packages: some demand truth 
and reconciliation commissions, others cash payments, others education funds, and some 
demand direct recompense (e.g., returning land that was taken away; Blatz et al., 2008). 
Certainly, these reparations offers each serve a somewhat different function, and will be 
psychologically satisfying for different reasons and under different circumstances. If future 
research could determine the psychological effects each of these compensation measures have, 
it could guide governments‘ responses; governments could tailor the offer to the psychological 
needs in the current situation. It would also be helpful to delineate the conditions under which 
majority and aggrieved minority group members will support these measures. 
What role do power and politics play? 
Although I have focused on the psychology of government apologies and 
compensation, I recognize that whether or not governments apologize and offer compensation, 
in part, is a political decision. Governments probably try to gauge the demand for redress 
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among members of the previously victimized minority and opposition among the majority. A 
government confronting a divided minority and nearly unanimous opposition from the 
majority is unlikely to make redress a priority.  
As another example, consider Germany‘s response to Nazi atrocities, which is often 
cited as a model for government redress (Brooks, 1999). Even in this instance, however, 
political exigencies appeared to play an important role. Successive German governments have 
apologized and offered extensive reparations to Jewish victims, but offered relatively little to 
homosexuals or Romany people (gypsies) who were also targeted by the Nazis for elimination 
(Brooks, 1999). The allies pressured the Germans to aid the Jewish people, but seemed less 
concerned about other groups (Brooks, 1999). Similarly, the international community exerted 
relatively little pressure on Japan to provide reparations for its war crimes (Brooks, 1999). 
This lack of external pressure may help explain why Japan offered relatively little by way of 
apology or financial compensation. More recently, the premier of the Canadian province of 
Alberta offered an apology and over 140 million dollars of compensation to individuals who 
had been forcibly sterilized between 1928 and 1970 after being labeled as ―mental defectives‖ 
(―Alberta Apologizes,‖ 1999). The government of Alberta ―spontaneously‖ offered redress to 
the entire group only after it had been successfully sued by some of the victims (―Alberta 
Apologizes,‖ 1999). Redress is partly about healing and partly about justice, but a lot about 
pressure and politics. It is unclear how the politics and power that surround redress offers alter 
the effectiveness of apologies and compensation.  




In this thesis, I tested hypotheses derived from well-established social psychological 
theories to determine if they can explain reactions to offers of apology and compensation. My 
goal was not to create a competition amongst these theories, but to test whether they explain 
variance in reactions to apologies and compensation. These theories were designed to explain 
human behavior in important domains. In no way do I want to imply that if a particular theory 
does not explain how people respond to apologies and compensation, it loses importance.    
Concluding Thoughts 
This thesis attests to the power of social psychology to provide novel insights into 
important issues. Many scholars have discussed the usefulness of apologies and compensation. 
Using the methods of social psychology I was able to test many of their assertions. Some 
assertions were supported, some were not. More important than providing a means to test 
assumptions, however, social psychological theory offered novel predictions for how 
apologies and compensation are beneficial, and why they may or may not help. I think it is 
evident from this thesis that the theory and methods of social psychology can provide 
important insights into discussions of the effects of apologies and compensation for historical 
injustices.  
Opposition to apologies and compensation amongst a majority group can be strong 
(―Polling Report,‖ 2008), and in some cases, extreme (Viles, 2002). In light of this opposition, 
many scholars and politicians (Brooks, 1999) have expressed concerns that offering apologies 
and compensation will do more harm than good because the majority group will evidence a 
backlash against the apology, the government, and the aggrieved minority. In the face of 
occasionally strong opposition to apologies and compensation, it may seem impossible to 
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elicit support for them. However, anecdotal evidence, polling data, and the results of the 
current studies suggest that opposition to apologies and compensation will melt away once 
they are offered. As Nelson Mandella once stated, ―it always seems impossible until it‘s done‖ 
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―Virginia Expresses ‗Profound Regret‘‖ (2007, February 24). Virginia expresses ‗profound 








Virginia recently became the first state to officially offer an expression of regret for 
its role in slavery (―Virginia Expresses ‗Profound Regret‘,‖ 2007). Five other states have since 
offered apologies or pseudo-apologies including Maryland, North Carolina, Alabama, New 
York, and New Jersey.  
2
 Because support for an apology was so high to begin with, I recoded responses to this 
question to create a categorical variable. If participants ‗agreed‘ or ‗strongly agreed‘ that an 
apology should be offered, I coded that they showed high support for the apology. However, if 
participants only somewhat agreed, were neutral, or disagreed, I coded that as low support 
(only 6 out of 125 participants disagreed to any extent). In the no apology condition 71% of 
participants offered high in support for the apology, but in the apology condition high support 
was endorsed by 95% of participants. This increase was significant, χ
2
(1) = 12.59, p < .001.  
3
 Because scores on the forgiveness scale were so high, I may have failed to observe an 
effect because of ceiling issues. Thus, Chinese Canadian participants may forgive White 
Canadians more after both an apology and compensation were offered, but I did not detect it 
because forgiveness was so high. To test for ceiling effects I analyzed the data non-
parametrically by coding any response 6.6 or higher as high forgiveness and any response and 
any response lower than 6.6 as low forgiveness. In the no apology-no compensation condition 
50% of respondents were high forgivers, and in the apology and compensation condition the 
exact same number of respondents, 50%, were high forgivers. Thus, although there might still 
be an effect on forgiveness that is being lost because the scores on forgiveness are in the 




 Because scores on the identity with Chinese Canadians were so high, I may have 
failed to observe an effect because of ceiling issues. Thus, Chinese Canadian participants may 
have identified with Chinese Canadians more after both an apology and compensation were 
offered, but I did not detect it because identity was so high. To test for ceiling effects I 
analyzed the data non-parametrically by coding any response 6.3 or higher as high 
identification and any response and any response lower than 6.3 as low identification. In the 
no apology-no compensation condition 48% of respondents were high identifiers, and in the 
apology and compensation condition 52% of respondents were high identifiers. This 
difference was not significant, χ
2
(1) = 0.54, p = .43. Thus, although there might still be an 
effect on forgiveness that is being lost because the scores on identity with Chinese Canadians 





Appendix A: Materials for Apology and Reparations Conditions in Studies 1 and 2 
Treatment of the Chinese in Canada 
 
Near the end of the Nineteenth Century, the Canadian Government persuaded Chinese to 
Canada as cheap labour to construct the Canadian Pacific Railway (CPR). The Canadian 
Government paid them a wage of 75 cents per day, about half the amount received by European 
railway workers. Approximately 7,000 Chinese men came. The Canadian Government promised 
the Chinese adequate food and space on the ships bringing them to Canada. Instead, they received 
little food and were squashed into very small living spaces for several months. Many died before 
they even reached Canada. 
Although both Chinese and Europeans constructed the railway, the Canadian Government 
required the Chinese to perform more dangerous and life-threatening jobs. Chinese workers 
transported powerful and hazardous explosives and laid rail along dangerous mountain pathways. 
Many Chinese labourers died in rock explosions, were buried under collapsed tunnels, or drowned 
when incomplete bridges collapsed beneath them. When the work was extremely dangerous, for 
example placing explosives in caves, the Canadian Government bribed Chinese to volunteer. If 
they survived, a family member would receive a fully paid passage to Canada. If they died, their 
family would receive nothing. Many died. Approximately 1,000 Chinese labourers lost their lives 
constructing the CPR. 
The Canadian Government promised Chinese labourers a return ticket to China when their 
work was completed. The Canadian Government broke its promise and refused to pay for the 
tickets. In addition, the Canadian Government forced Chinese to pay a ―head tax‖ of $50 
(equivalent to $15,070 today) to enter the country. This tax restricted the number of Chinese 
immigrants and made it even more difficult for the Chinese labourers to reunite with their 
families. The head tax was a form of legalized racial discrimination. The Chinese were the only 
ethnic group required to pay such a tax. In 1901, the Canadian Government raised the head tax to 
$100 and in 1904, the Canadian Government increased it to $500.  
The Canadian Government collected $26 million from the Chinese head tax. At the same 
time, the Canadian Government spent close to $19 million encouraging and funding the 
immigration of 3.25 million Europeans to Canada. With the amount of money that the Chinese 
contributed from the head tax, the Canadian Government could have: (1) constructed another 
Intercontinental Railway, or (2) constructed the B.C. legislative buildings (the most impressive 
piece of architecture in western Canada) 25 times, or (3) purchased Alaska three times, since the 
U.S. government only paid $7 million for it. 
In 1923, the Canadian Government dropped the head tax and simply banned Chinese from 
immigrating to Canada. Indeed, the Canadian Government did not allow Chinese to immigrate 
again until 1947, which meant that many men remained separated from their wives and children 
who were forced to remain in China. In addition, the Canadian Government denied Chinese living 
in Canada many civil rights. The Canadian Government did not allow them to vote. The Canadian 
Government did not allow them to work in the occupation of their choice. The Canadian 
Government did not permit them to leave and re-enter the country. However, the Canadian 
Government did require them to pay taxes and to serve in the armed forces during times of war.  
 
 90 
For a long time, various members of the Chinese community have demanded redress.  
Some requested that the Canadian Government acknowledge the injustice of its anti-Chinese 
policies and apologize. Others went further, demanding that the Government offer financial 
compensation to descendants of those who paid the head tax and to the Chinese community in 
general. Some non Chinese Canadians have opposed offering official apologies or financial 
compensation. They argue that it makes no sense to try to remedy past injustices. Canadians 
alive today should not apologize, because they have not harmed the Chinese. Past injustices 
simply reflect public attitudes and beliefs at the time.    
In 1996, the Canadian Government officially apologized for the injustices committed against 
the Chinese in the past and offered financial compensation. It apologized for the head tax 
program and for other anti-Chinese policies. Below is a brief excerpt from the Royal 
Proclamation in which the government apologized. 
 
―By issuing the following Royal Proclamation, the Government of Canada officially 
apologizes for the head tax policy and all other official policies, which we now 
recognize as discriminatory against Chinese. We recognize that these policies were 
wrong. ‖  
In addition to this apology, the Canadian government offered $20,000 to every family member 
directly descended from Chinese labourers, $12 million for a Chinese community fund, and 
$18 million to create a Canadian race relations foundation. In total, the government paid $47 
million, about $6700 per Chinese labourer.  
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Appendix B: Full Text of Apology and Description of Compensation for Head Tax 
On June 22, 2006 the Prime Minister of Canada, Stephen Harper, offered an apology for the 
Head Tax and related policies. Below, we include sections of Harper‘s speech to Parliament. 
Please read this passage carefully. We will ask your opinion on some of Harper‘s statements.  
I rise today to formally turn the page on an unfortunate period in Canada's past. 
One during which a group of people — who only sought to build a better life — was 
repeatedly and deliberately singled out for unjust treatment. 
I speak, of course, of the ―Head Tax‖ that was imposed on Chinese immigrants to this country, 
as well as the other restrictive measures that followed. 
The Canada we know today would not exist were it not for the efforts of the Chinese labourers 
who began to arrive in the mid-19th century. 
Almost exclusively young men, these immigrants made the difficult decision to leave their 
families behind in order to pursue opportunities in a country halfway around the world. 
Beginning in 1881, over 15,000 of these Chinese pioneers became involved in the most 
important nation-building enterprise in Canadian history — the construction of the Canadian 
Pacific Railway. 
This transcontinental link was the ribbon of steel that bound our country together. It was an 
engineering feat — one for which the back-breaking toil of Chinese labourers was largely 
responsible — that was instrumental to the settlement of the West and the subsequent 
development of the Canadian economy. 
The conditions under which these men worked were at best harsh, and at times impossible: 
tragically, some one thousand Chinese labourers died building the CPR. 
But in spite of it all, these Chinese immigrants persevered, and in doing so, helped to ensure 
the future of Canada. 
But from the moment that the railway was completed, Canada turned its back on these men. 
[In] 1885, a ―Head Tax‖ of $50 was imposed on Chinese newcomers in an attempt to deter 
immigration. 
…the government subsequently raised the amount to $100 in 1900, and then to $500 — the 
equivalent of two years' wages — in 1903. 
This tax remained in place until 1923, when the government … effectively banned most 
Chinese immigrants until 1947. 
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The government of Canada recognizes the stigma and exclusion experienced by the Chinese 
as a result. 
We acknowledge the high cost of the ―Head Tax‖ meant many family members were left 
behind in China, never to be reunited, or that families lived apart and, in some cases, in 
poverty, for many years. 
We also recognize that our failure to truly acknowledge these historical injustices has led 
many in the community from seeing themselves as fully Canadian. 
…on behalf of all Canadians and the Government of Canada, we offer a full apology to 
Chinese Canadians for the ―Head Tax‖ and express our deepest sorrow for the subsequent 
exclusion of Chinese immigrants. 
This apology is not about liability today: it is about reconciliation with those who endured 
such hardship, and the broader Chinese-Canadian community, one that continues to make 
such an invaluable contribution to our great country. 
And while Canadian courts have ruled that the head tax, and immigration prohibition, were 
legally authorized, we fully accept the moral responsibility to acknowledge these shameful 
polices of our past. 
For over six decades, these race-based financial measures, aimed solely at the Chinese, were 
implemented with deliberation by the Canadian state. 
This was a grave injustice, and one we are morally obligated to acknowledge. 
To give substantial meaning to today's apology, the Government of Canada will offer 
symbolic payments to living ―Head Tax‖ payers and living spouses of deceased payers. 
In addition, we will establish funds to help finance community projects aimed at 
acknowledging the impact of past wartime measures and immigration restrictions on ethno-
cultural communities. 
No country is perfect. Like all countries, Canada has made mistakes in its past, and we realize 
that. 
Canadians, however, are a good and just people, acting when we've committed wrong. 
And even though the ―Head Tax‖ — a product of a profoundly different time — lies far in our 
past, we feel compelled to right this historic wrong for the simple reason that it is the decent 
thing to do, a characteristic to be found at the core of the Canadian soul. 
…in closing, let me assure the House that this government will continually strive to ensure 
that similar unjust practices are never allowed to happen again. 
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We have the collective responsibility to build a country based firmly on the notion of equality 
of opportunity, regardless of one's race or ethnic origin. 
Our deep sorrow over the racist actions of our past will nourish our unwavering commitment 




In addition to this apology, the Government of Canada announced that it would provide 
$20,000 to Head Tax payers, or if they were no longer alive, to their widows. Although 81,000 
people paid the ―Head Tax‖, there are 29 living Head Tax Payers and approximately 250 
living widows of ―Head Tax‖ payers.  
The Government of Canada also announced that it would create a $24 million program to fund 
community projects linked to past governmental wrongs and a $10 million fund to educate 
people about past wrongs.  
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Appendix C: Memory Data in Studies 3 and 4 
 In the last two studies, after they read a description of the Head Tax, I asked 
participants to recall whether they had heard of any action the government had taken to 
redress it. In Study 4, I also asked participants, before they read the description of the Head 
Tax, if they knew about the Head Tax and related policies. Responses to these questions are 
described below.   
Study 3 
 Knowledge of the Head Tax Apology and Compensation.  Twenty-four Chinese (40%) 
and 24 non-Chinese (41%) participants indicated that they had heard that the government had 
taken some kind of action in recent months. I coded participants‘ responses to the open ended 
question for whether they remembered both the apology and compensation, just the apology, 
just the compensation, or were mistaken in what they heard. One Chinese (4%) and five (21%) 
non-Chinese Canadian participants were mistaken in what they recalled. Eleven participants 
of each ethnicity (46%) only mentioned the cash payments, four Chinese Canadians (17%) 
and two non-Chinese Canadians (8%) only mentioned the apology, and eight Chinese 
Canadians (33%) and six non-Chinese Canadians (25%) had heard of both the apology and 
cash payments. Although it appears that Chinese Canadian respondents had greater knowledge 
of the package than non-Chinese Canadians, this difference was not significant, χ
2
(3) = 3.62, p 
= .31.  
Study 4 
 Knowledge of the Head Tax. Sixty-seven Chinese Canadian (74% of the sample) and 
24 non-Chinese Canadian (26% of the sample) participants indicated that they had heard about 
the Head Tax. This ethnicity difference was significant χ
2
(1) = 14.30, p < .001.  
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 Knowledge of the Head Tax Apology.   Forty-five Chinese Canadian (46%) and 10 
non-Chinese Canadian (18%) participants indicated that they had heard that the government 
had taken some kind of action in the last year. The ethnicity difference was significant, χ
2
(1) = 
15.84, p < .001. Participants were asked to describe what they had heard. Again, I coded 
participants‘ responses for whether they remembered both the apology and compensation, just 
the apology, just the compensation, or were mistaken in what they heard. Five (50%) non-
Chinese Canadian and two Chinese Canadian (4%) participants were mistaken in what they 
recalled. Three (17%) non-Chinese and 15 Chinese Canadian participants (33%) only 
mentioned the cash payments, 1 non-Chinese (10%) and 7 Chinese (16%) Canadians only 
mentioned the apology, and 1 non-Chinese (13%) and 21 non-Chinese (47%) Canadians had 
heard of both the apology and compensation. Chinese Canadian participants who claimed they 
had heard that the government had taken an action were more accurate than non-Chinese 
Canadians who claimed the same thing, χ
2
(3) = 16.29, p = .001.  
Discussion of Memory Results in Both Studies 
 The memory data in Studies 3 and 4 are interesting. Two thirds of the aggrieved 
minority and a third of the majority knew of the Head Tax, but few people knew about the 
apology and compensation. This result is discouraging because redress cannot have any effect 
if few people know about it. I fully expect more people to be aware of it, given more time. 
Groups tend to suppress memories of injustices they have committed because these memories 
are threatening to social identities (Blatz & M. Ross, in press; Sahdra & M. Ross, 2007). 
However, as the studies in this thesis reveal, majority group members evaluate apologies and 
compensation favorably. Apologies can turn threatening memories into positive memories 
(Blatz & M. Ross, in press). Because this event has been apologized for it will feature 
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prominently in collective memories: it will be written into textbooks; documentaries will be 
made about it; groups arguing for reparations for other injustices will cite the Head Tax as 
precedent (Blatz & M. Ross, in press). Anecdotally, when I tell people that my dissertation is 
on apologies and compensation for historical injustices, they, almost without exception, all say 
―oh, just like Japanese internment.‖ Just like Japanese internment, in a few years Canadians 
will be able to tell you all about the Chinese Head Tax and the apology that was offered for it.  
 Note that in Study 4, the aggrieved minority knew more about the apology and 
compensation than the majority group did, but a similar difference did not arise in Study 3. 
This difference is intriguing. It seems that informing the majority group about the injustice 
before any apology was offered (as I did in Study 3) led them to notice the apology and 
compensation. However, when not given information about the injustice beforehand (as most 
Canadians, including the participants in Study 4, were not), fewer members of the majority 
group noticed the apology. This suggests that majority groups may notice apologies and 
compensation for historical events for which they have greater knowledge.   
 In neither study did people‘s prior knowledge of the apology and compensation affect 
their responses. It is only upon reading the full apology and description of compensation that 
the redress had any effect. These data suggest that direct experience with an apology and 
compensation is necessary. Janna Thompson (2008) argues that apologies and offers of 
compensation need to be marked by large, well-publicized public ceremonies to be effective. 
It cannot blend in to the daily news cycle. These data support this assertion. In the future, 




Appendix D: Identification and System Endorsement as Predictors of Results 
Study 1 
Identity with Canadians as a Predictor 
 I centered identity with Canadians and entered it, apology effect coded (no apology = -
1, apology = 1), compensation effect coded (no compensation = -1, apology and compensation 
= 1) and their interactions in multiple linear regression analyses predicting each of the 
variables. Results revealed a main effect of identity with Canadians on attitudes towards 
White Canadians, β = .37, t(116) = 3.92, p < .001, a main effect of identity on attitudes 
towards Chinese Canadians, β = .20, t(116) = 2.05, p = .04, and a main effect of identity for 
forgiveness, β = .24 t(109) = 2.36, p = .02. There was also an unpredicted three-way 
interaction between apology, compensation and identity with Canadians on support for 
compensation, β = -.20, t(116) = 2.15, p = .03. To examine this unpredicted interaction, I split 
the file on apology, and included compensation effect coded, centered identity with Canada, 
and their interaction in a regression equation predicting support for compensation. Neither 
two-way interaction was significant (βs < |.22|, ts < 1.93, ps > .07).  
Identity with Chinese Canadians as a Predictor 
 I centered identity with Chinese Canadians and entered it, apology effect coded (no 
apology = -1, apology = 1), compensation effect coded (no compensation = -1, apology and 
compensation = 1) and their interactions in multiple linear regression analyses predicting each 
of the variables. I did not control for identity with Canadians in this analysis because identity 
with Canadians and identity with Chinese Canadians were not correlated, r(116) = -.09, p = 
.35. Results revealed a main effect of identity with Chinese Canadians on support for apology, 
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β = .32, t(108) = 3.47, p < .001, a main effect of identity on support for compensation, β = .19, 
t(108) = 1.97, p = .05, and a main effect of identity on attitudes towards Chinese Canadians, β 
= .21, t(108) = 2.05, p = .04.  
Study 2 
Identity with Canadians as a Predictor 
 I centered identity with Canadians and entered it, apology effect coded (no apology = -
1, apology = 1), compensation effect coded (no compensation = -1, apology and compensation 
= 1) and their interactions in multiple linear regression analyses predicting each of the 
variables. Results revealed a main effect of identity with Canada on attitudes towards White 
Canadians, β = .36, t(109) = 3.94, p < .001, and a main effect of identity on attitudes towards 
Chinese Canadians, β = .22, t(109) = 2.34, p = .02.  
Study 3 
Identity with Canadians 
As the measure of identity with Canadians did not differ across time, I averaged the 
scores obtained in the two surveys to examine correlates of identity. I centered this variable 
and entered it, ethnicity effect coded (non-Chinese = -1, Chinese = 1), and their interaction in 
multiple linear regression analyses predicting evaluation of the apology and reparations 
measures. Participants who identified more highly with Canada evaluated the apology more 
favorably, β = .27, t(113) = 2.69, p = .01. There were also significant ethnicity by Canadian 
identity interactions for the items asking whether the apology was designed to win Chinese 
Canadian votes, β = .30, t(113) = 2.14, p = .03, whether it was right to offer compensation to 
Head Tax Payers, β = -.40, t(112) = 2.92, p < .01, and whether it was right to offer 
compensation to widows of Head Tax payers, β = -.33, t(113) = 2.36, p = .02. For Chinese 
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participants, identity with Canada did not predict responses on these items (all βs < .12, all ts 
< 1, and all ps > .33). However, non-Chinese participants who identified highly with Canada 
were more likely to disagree with the statement that the apology was designed to win non-
Chinese votes, β = -.31, t(57) = 2.16, p = .02, as well as to agree with the statement that it was 
right to offer compensation to Head Tax payers, β = .44, t(57) = 3.70, p < .001, and their 
widows, β = .38, t(57) = 3.08, p < .001.  
Identity with Chinese Canadians  
 I examined whether identity with Chinese Canadians would predict results. I only 
collected identity with Chinese Canadians amongst the self-identified Chinese Canadian 
sample. As the measure of identity with Chinese Canadians also did not differ across time, I 
averaged the scores obtained in the two surveys. I did not enter identification with Canadians 
as a control variable because it was uncorrelated with identification with Chinese Canadians, 
r(93) = -.002, p = .99. I correlated this measure with the evaluation of apology and reparations 
measures. Compared to those who identified with Chinese Canadians less, those who 
identified highly with Chinese Canadians tended to evaluate the apology more favorably, 
r(58) = .24, p = .07, thought that the government was apologizing just to win votes in the next 
election, r(58) = .22, p = .10, and thought that it was good to offer compensation to Head Tax 
payers, r(57) = .29, p = .03.  
System Endorsement 
 As the measure of system endorsement did not differ across time, I averaged the scores 
obtained in the two surveys. I centered this variable and entered it, ethnicity effect coded (non-
Chinese = -1, Chinese = 1), and their interaction in multiple linear regression analyses 
predicting evaluation of the apology and reparations measures. Results revealed a few main 
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effects of system endorsement, but no interactions. Participants who endorsed the system 
evaluated the apology more favorably, β = .33, t(113) = 3.59, p < .001, were more likely to 
respond that with the apology justice has finally been done, β = .25, t(112) = 2.62, p = .01, 
more likely to respond that it was right to offer compensation to Head Tax payers, β = .21, 
t(112) = 2.22, p = .03, and were more likely to respond that it was right to offer compensation 
to widows of Head Tax payers, β = .25, t(113) = 2.59, p = .01. Put another way, high system 
endorsers from both groups, unsurprisingly, endorsed the actions the government took more 
than low system endorsers. 
Study 4 
Identity with Canadians as a Predictor 
 I centered identity with Canadians and entered it, ethnicity effect coded (non-Chinese 
= -1, Chinese = 1), questionnaire effect coded (no apology or reparations = -1, apology and 
reparations = 1) and their interactions in multiple linear regression analyses. Results revealed 
simple main effects for identity with Canada. Highly identified Canadians evaluated the 
apology more favorably, β = .26, t(103) = 2.45, p = .02, felt more positive towards European 
Canadians, β = .30, t(101) = 2.63, p = .01, more positive towards Chinese Canadians, β = .33, 
t(99) = 2.90, p = .01, and tended to feel more sympathy for the Head Tax payers, β = .21, 
t(103) = 1.78 p = .08.  
Identity with Chinese Canadians as a Predictor 
 I centered identity with Chinese Canadians and entered it, questionnaire effect coded, 
and their interaction into multiple regression analyses. I only included Chinese Canadians in 
this analysis. I did not enter identification with Canadians as a control variable because it was 
uncorrelated with identification with Chinese Canadians, r(87) = .14, p = .20. Those highly 
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identified with Chinese Canadians evaluated Chinese Canadians evaluated the apology more 
favorably, β = .23, t(82) = 2.13, p = .04, felt marginally more positive towards European 
Canadians, β = .21, t(83) = 1.93, p = .06, more positive towards Chinese Canadians, β = .39, 
t(83) = 3.74, p < .001, and expressed more sympathy for Head Tax payers, β = .43, t(83) = 
4.32, p < .001.  
Discussion of Individual Predictors Results 
 Across the studies, people who identified highly with being either Chinese Canadian or 
Canadian felt more positive towards both Chinese and White or European Canadians. This is a 
finding we commonly find: those who identify highly with a group feel more positive towards 
other groups (M. Ross, 2007).  
I also entered identity and system justification as predictors of support for or 
evaluation of apologies and compensation. System endorsement predicted both Chinese and 
non-Chinese Canadians‘ evaluations of the apology and compensation. Not surprisingly, 
people who endorsed the system endorsed the actions that system had taken. Non-Chinese 
Canadians‘ evaluations of the apology and reparations were also predicted by identity with 
Canadians. The more highly identified majority group participants were with Canada, the 
more positive they were towards the offer. On the other hand, Chinese Canadians‘ responses 
were occasionally predicted by their identity with Canadians, but were usually predicted more 
strongly by their Chinese Canadian identity than their Canadian identity: highly identified 
Chinese Canadians felt more positive towards the apology and reparations than less identified 
Chinese Canadians. Interestingly, the relation between identification and evaluation of the 
apology and compensation were not moderated by whether or not the apology had been 
offered. Those who identify highly with Canadians or Chinese Canadians evaluate an apology 
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and reparations positively whether that measure is offered or not. These data confirm the 
proposition that system justification and identity motives are relevant to people‘s reactions to 
historical injustices. Although strength of identification and system endorsement predicted the 
degree to which participants valued apologies and compensation, offering apologies and 
compensation did not predict the degree to which participants valued their identities or 
endorse their system.  
The identification results run counter to a previous study (Doosje, Branscombe, 
Manstead, & Spears, 2006). Doosje and colleagues (2006) found, that before an apology, 
Dutch participants who identified highly with being Dutch felt more negative towards 
reparations for injustices committed by the Netherlands against Indonesia in colonial times 
than those who identified less. But, when participants read that an apology or reparations had 
been offered, highly identified participants increased support for reparations. There are a 
number of differences between this context and the Dutch context that can account for the 
differences in these patterns. The Dutch study tested international apologies, whereas I studied 
an apology offered to minority members in the same country. One could imagine that highly 
identified citizens favour the government offering apologies and reparations to people who 
live within their country, but oppose offering apologies and reparations to people in another 
country. Further research is needed to clarify the conditions under which strength of 
identification leads to increased or decreased support for apologies and reparations.  
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Table 1: Mean (and standard deviation) response as a function of the presence and absence of 




 No Yes 
 Compensation   
 ------------------------- -------------------------  
 No Yes No Yes  
_________________________________________________________________________ 
 Government Should Apologize 6.0a(1.0) 6.1a(1.0) 6.6b(0.6) 6.7b(0.6) 
 Government Should Compensate 4.8a(1.5) 5.7b(1.4) 5.1a(1.4) 5.7b(1.4) 
 Forgiveness – TRIM  6.3ab(0.5) 6.2ab(0.7) 6.0b(0.7) 6.4a(0.5) 
 Evaluation of White Canadians  74.6a(13.1) 69.7a(17.0) 71.6a(12.8)  69.0a(17.4) 
 Evaluation of Chinese Canadians 72.4a(16.8) 76.9a(12.3) 76.3a(15.9)  72.2a(16.2) 
 Identity with Canadians  5.4a(1.2) 5.1a(1.4) 5.0a(1.5)  5.6a(0.9) 
 Identity with Chinese Canadians 6.0a(1.0) 6.3a(0.8) 6.0a(1.0) 6.2a(0.7) 
 Reflects Poorly on Government 5.3a(1.4) 5.4a(1.0) 5.5a(1.1) 5.2a(1.5) 
_________________________________________________________________________ 




Table 2: Mean (and standard deviation) response as a function of the presence and absence of 




 No Yes 
 Compensation   
 ------------------------- ------------------------   
 No Yes No Yes  
_________________________________________________________________________ 
 Government Should Apologize 6.3a(1.3) 6.0a(1.2) 6.5a(1.2) 6.4a(1.0) 
 Government Should Compensate 4.4a(1.7) 4.3a(1.9) 4.1a(1.7) 4.9a(1.9) 
 Evaluation of White Canadians 70.6a(18.3) 74.1ab(16.7) 72.4ab(19.6)  79.3b(14.4) 
 Evaluation of Chinese Canadians 68.9ab(13.6) 68.3ab(17.9) 63.5a(21.5)  73.4b(14.0) 
 Identity with Canadians  5.9a(1.1) 5.7a(1.3) 6.2a(0.9) 6.0a(1.0) 
 Reflects poorly on Government 5.7ab(1.1) 5.8b(1.2) 5.1a(1.8) 5.3ab(1.3) 
_________________________________________________________________________ 
Note. For each dependent variable, numbers that share subscripts do not differ at p < .05 when 
testing simple effects. 
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Table 3: Mean (and standard deviation) response to apology and compensation as a function 




 Non-Chinese Chinese   
__________________________________________________________________ 
 
Evaluation of Apology 5.4*(1.4) 5.0*(1.0) 
Redress Effectiveness 3.6*(0.9) 3.2*(1.0) 
Apologizing to Win Votes 4.1*(1.7) 4.8*(1.3) 
Right to Compensate Payers 4.8(1.5) 4.6(1.3) 
Right to Compensate Widows 4.8(1.6) 4.7(1.2) 
Wrong Not to Compensate Descendants 3.9*(1.6) 4.9*(1.5) 
__________________________________________________________________ 
Note. An * indicates that the means differ at p < .05, a 
1
 indicates that the means  
differ at p < .10.
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Table 4: Means (and standard deviation) response to Head Tax as a function of ethnicity and 




 Non-Chinese Chinese 
 Time  
 (before or after apology and compensation)   
 ---------------------- ----------------------  
 Before After Before After  
_________________________________________________________________________ 
 Evaluation of European Canadians 5.0(1.1)  5.2(1.1) 4.5(1.0)  4.7(1.2) 
 Evaluation of Chinese Canadians 5.0(1.2)  4.9(1.3) 5.0(1.2)  5.1(1.1) 
 Identity with Canadians  6.3(1.0)  6.2(1.1) 5.2(1.0)  5.2(1.1) 
 Identity with Chinese Canadians    5.8(1.1)  5.8(0.9) 
 System Endorsement 4.8(1.0)  4.9(1.1) 4.3(1.0)  4.3(1.1)  
 Reflects Poorly on Government 3.9*(2.2) 3.0*(1.8) 4.1(1.7) 3.7(1.8) 




(1.2) 6.1*(0.8)  5.7*(1.1) 
_________________________________________________________________________ 
Note. * indicates that the means within each ethnicity between Time 1 and Time 2 differ at p < 
.05. 
1
 indicates that means within each ethnicity between Time 1 and Time 2 differ at p < .10. 
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Table 5: Mean (and standard deviation) response to Head Tax as a function of ethnicity and 




 Non-Chinese Chinese 
 Apology and Compensation  
 -------------------------------- ---------------------------------
  
 Prospective Retrospective Prospective Retrospective
  
__________________________________________________________________________ 
Evaluation of Apology 3.7a(0.7) 4.6b(1.0) 4.1a(0.7)  4.0a(1.1) 
Evaluation of European Canadians 67.1a(17.1) 72.3b(13.4) 63.6a(15.9)  64.9a(14.4) 
Evaluation of Chinese Canadians 60.7a(22.0) 62.6a(17.9) 74.9b(14.0)  72.6b(16.5) 
Identity with Canadians 5.1a(0.9) 5.1a(0.8) 4.9a(0.7)  4.1b(1.1) 
Identity with Chinese Canadians    5.3a(0.8)  5.4a(1.0)  
Reflects Poorly on Government 4.2a(2.0) 3.6a(1.6) 3.8a(2.0) 4.0a(1.6) 
Sympathy for Head Tax Payers 5.2a(1.5) 5.8ab(1.3) 6.0b(0.9)  6.0b(1.1) 
___________________________________________________________________________ 
Note. Values that do not share subscripts differ at p < .05.  
 
